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ABSTRACT
The world faces a class of environmental problems that defy problem
solving approaches based on the unilateral actions of government, industry,
or any other stakeholding interest. Multiple stakeholders, a great deal of
scientific uncertainty, and the necessary inclusion of non-technical
considerations characterize this class of problems. Existing processes to aid
governments in resolving technical issues and setting policy are not adequate
in the face of this complexity. Despite evidence indicating some movement
toward consensus-building activities, government policy generally results
from an adversarial process that leaves one or more interests unhappy with
the outcome, resulting in continued controversy and less-than-effective
policy. Complex environmental problems require a policy making approach
that enables government to overcome the obstacles of scientific uncertainty
and divergent stakeholder interests while not presuming that uncertainty
will be eliminated and that true consensus will result. Problem solvers can
achieve their objectives only through the creation of focused, fair, and
inclusive multistakeholder dialogues that can adapt, through a continuous
learning process, to the evolving understanding of a complex problem. An
ongoing effort at MIT to address the management of the future use of
chlorine provides an opportunity to create such an "adaptive" dialogue. In
this thesis, we describe five efforts (four previous and one ongoing) by MIT
researchers to expand the university's role in the process of finding solutions
to specific environmental problems through multistakeholder workshops
and conferences. Our examination leads to the conclusion that while the
university may be able to serve well in many capacities, including that of
"neutral" or "objective" facilitator, its traditional role as educator is the key to
a successful dialogue. In order to succeed in promoting an ongoing,
educational, adaptive process, the university should make the design of post-
conference dialogue mechanisms central to both the planning and execution
of a multistakeholder gathering.
Thesis Supervisor: David Marks
Title: James Mason Crafts Professor of Civil and
Environmental Engineering
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INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Greenpeace published a report entitled "The Product is the
Poison" in which this environmental organization called for an across-the-
board ban on the use of chlorine as an industrial feedstock. In a world in
which an estimated 15,000 commercial compounds contain chlorine while
numerous others rely on chlorine at some point in their manufacture, a call
for such a ban, if acted upon, is no small matter. Chlorine plays a direct or
indirect role in the daily life of nearly everyone on the planet, whether it be
in the disinfection of drinking water, the production of plastics, the
agricultural use of pesticides, or the manufacture of silicon computer chips.
The call for a chlorine ban grew out of the environmental
consequences associated with a number of notorious chlorinated compounds,
the so-called "bad actors" such as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT),
dioxin, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Each is well known for its
actual or potential threat to human health and natural ecosystems, and has
been accordingly regulated or banned. In the view of Greenpeace and other
environmental activists the potential for the existence of additional, similarly
dangerous chlorinated compounds is great simply because of the enormous
number of candidates. Since it is not practical to test each compound to
determine its toxicological effects, the only rational policy, it is argued, is to
ban the use of chlorine altogether since it will presumably be too late once the
next bad actor is identified. This is an example of what has become known as
the "precautionary principle."
The Greenpeace movement gained momentum in 1992 when the
International Joint Commission, a U.S.-Canadian government organization
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responsible for overseeing the management of the Great Lakes region,
recommended that these two nations begin the process of eliminating
chlorine as an industrial feedstock. While Greenpeace may have a reputation
as being far to the left on issues with which it is concerned, and therefore less
likely to reach a mainstream audience, the echoing of their call by a less well-
known but clearly a more centrist group helped to carry the possibility of a
chlorine ban to the general public. In October 1993, a story describing the
effort to ban chlorine was published in USA Today.
The chlorine industry has responded vigorously to those who question
chlorine's value to society. Expressing their willingness to cease using
chlorine in any instance in which strong scientific data supports such an
action, the industry is quick to point out that those calling for a ban have yet
to provide such data. The industry argues further that the consequences of a
ban in economic terms do not justify the supposed benefits to be gained. A
study commissioned by the chlorine industry found that the cumulative
benefit to society of chlorine chemistry is at least $100 billion, including 1.4
million jobs in chlorine-related industries (Amato 1993, Kirschner 1993).
Most recently, the American Public Health Association issued a
carefully worded statement based on a "rebuttable presumption that chlorine-
containing organic chemicals pose a significant risk." The APHA called for
industry to demonstrate, before using chlorine-based chemicals, that 1) for a
particular compound, use, or process there is no significant risk, and 2) there
are no available substitutes in the form of chemical or process changes that
would result in a lower overall risk. The statement also included a specific
call, based on the current availability of substitute technologies, for a
"measurable and progressive reduction" of chlorine-based bleaching in the
pulp and paper industry and of ozone-depleting chlorinated compounds
10
toward a goal of eliminating these uses entirely. In recognition of the
complexity of the chlorine issue, the APHA statement included support for
legislation that would assist workers displaced by any elimination or phase-
out of chlorine use (APHA 1994).
To the layperson, calling for a ban on chlorine seems rather curious.
Most people remember from high school chemistry that chlorine is an
element on the periodic table and that table salt is otherwise known as
sodium chloride. How then is it possible to justify a call for a ban on
chlorine? It has been our experience that even within the academic
community, those who are being introduced to the chlorine controversy for
the first time often laugh at the notion of banning an element. In reality, of
course, no one is calling for an alteration of the periodic table or the
elimination of salt from the world's diet. Groups like Greenpeace are clear in
their intention to ban chlorine as an industrial feedstock, the use that gives
rise to undesirable environmental consequences. In fact, reports suggest that
Greenpeace's approach to the issue will continue to be an incremental one,
targeting classes of compounds or uses (e.g., bleaching in the pulp and paper
industry or plastics manufacturing) one at a time and country by country
rather than seeking an admittedly unrealistic complete and global ban
(Amato 1993).
Yet when a complicated environmental issue such as this enters the
public debate, as it has through the publication of stories in newspapers like
USA Today the presence of multiple stakeholding interests and a wide range
of both technical and non-technical considerations makes the task of
reconciling the competing interests both more pressing and more difficult to
accomplish. Those who must make difficult environmental management
decisions, be they government policy makers, industrial managers, or
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environmental advocates, find that there is little if any consensus upon
which to base their actions.
It was in this atmosphere of growing controversy that researchers in
the MIT Technology, Business, and the Environment program (a unit of the
Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development) were approached
in 1990 by a visiting scholar from Norway to initiate a study of the
management of the future use of chlorine. The MIT/Norwegian Chlorine
Policy Study received the support of the Norwegian Ministry of the
Environment, Statoil (a Norwegian petroleum concern), Norsk Hydro (a
major international producer of chlorine), and the Norwegian Smelters
Association. One of the primary objectives of this work has been the
engagement of the various chlorine stakeholders in a dialogue aimed at
uncovering and working through the uncertainties that are impeding
efficient and effective decision making.
Gathering people with a common interest to further the objectives of
the group is an increasingly common practice. As issues become broader in
scope, representation at the gatherings broadens to incorporate all of the
perspectives deemed necessary to achieve the stated objectives. Groups of
people with a common profession and a common perspective give way to
groups of people with more varied backgrounds who still share a common
perspective. At some point, an issue becomes sufficiently complicated that in
order to find better solutions it seems necessary to gather people with varied
backgrounds who do not share a common perspective. The natural endpoint
for this kind of process is the gathering intended to include representation
from every possible background and perspective so that there is an
opportunity to reach consensus and resolve the issue.
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The management of the future use of chlorine is an example of an
issue that typifies the complexities of current environmental concerns.
Problems such as this are now seen as part of an intricate web of global
development concerns. The intricacy of these problems is evident in the fact
that they are no longer simply questions of scientific or technological
uncertainty but questions that require careful consideration of other, non-
technical components. The political, economic, legal, and sometimes ethical
implications of a problem are essential factors in the search for a lasting
solution.
Our purpose in this thesis is to examine the role played by a research
university like MIT in the formulation and execution of multistakeholder
dialogues when technological solutions are sought for environmental
problems that display this level of complexity. We will use the chlorine issue
as the vehicle with which to promote a vision of a new form of dialogue. A
key point will be that the complexities and uncertainties associated with these
problems require a dialogue that is based on adaptability and flexibility.
Seeking solutions must not be a static process but a dynamic one. By looking
in some detail at specific examples of MIT efforts to bring stakeholders
together to discuss technological issues, we hope to begin to develop an
understanding of how far and with what degree of success the research
university might go in establishing such a dialogue. We will propose that at
least in the United States, with the continued and growing resistance to
regulatory mandates and regulation's great expense, the federal government
as well as industry and environmental groups should look to the university
to help them find more efficient and effective policy making and decision
making processes.
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Chapter 1 characterizes the atmosphere in which environmental
decision making and problem solving currently occurs. Also, in support of
the university role we will propose, we will present evidence in the form of
previous arguments for greater university activism as well as more recent,
non-academic initiatives to move in the direction of meaningful dialogue. In
Chapter 2, we will step back to examine the role of the research university in
advancing the interests of society and to describe the resources that an
institution like MIT has to offer to a complicated environmental debate.
Chapter 3 presents descriptions and analyses of four previous efforts
organized at MIT to foster a dialogue among stakeholders as a means of
addressing environmental concerns. These efforts, with subject matter
ranging from the specific (steel-making processes) to the more general
(environmental ramifications of durable goods), have in common the goal of
using the resources offered by MIT to accelerate and improve the process of
finding solutions. Because of the range in scope of the efforts undertaken at
MIT, it will be possible to come to some conclusions regarding the ability of
the research university to tackle broader, more complex problems. Chapter 4
returns to the ongoing effort at MIT to address the chlorine problem. We will
not only describe the direction in which this project is going, but also use the
lessons learned from the other MIT efforts to outline, in Chapter 5, a new type
of decision making, problem solving process designed especially for the
increasingly complex world of environmental management. The final
chapter offers some concluding thoughts about the global context in which
technological solutions to environmental problems really exist.
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CHAPTER 1- CHANGING NEEDS FOR A CHANGING WORLD
1.0 An Opening Context
One can begin to understand the need for a new approach to the
management of complex environmental issues simply by reading the popular
press. On an increasingly frequent basis, newspapers and magazines publish
stories describing government efforts to find solutions to problems deeply
rooted in science and technology. Also on an increasingly frequent basis, we
read about the less than scientifically rigorous manner in which government
officials and others undertake these efforts.
In two consecutive weeks recently, The New York Times published
stories in its Sunday magazine that illustrate this point. A cover story on the
program to develop a permanent, underground repository for high-level
nuclear wastes included some unsettling statements. The author quotes a
Senate staff member as saying that a purely scientific basis for selecting the
best site is less important than a "technically appropriate subsurface with a
compliant governor on top." When Congress selected Yucca Mountain, a
member of the House of Representatives is quoted as having said, "I am
participating in a nonscientific process - sticking it to Nevada" (Erikson 1994).
The previous week, a story profiling Jim Anderson, a leading
researcher in the field of stratospheric ozone chemistry, described an incident
in which Anderson testified before a Senate subcommittee at the time when
Congress was considering a ban on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). One Senator
reduced the detailed presentation of scientific findings to the simple question
of whether or not CFCs should be banned. Despite his misgivings about
linking personal opinion with scientific data, especially since he was the only
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person in the U.S. conducting this particular research, Anderson was pressed
for an answer (Shell 1994).
These two cases alone do not prove that the government is not willing
to make informed decisions on the basis of sound scientific evidence, nor is it
our intention to make such an argument. They do, however, show that it is
easy for the complexities of technical problems to be lost or overlooked in an
arena that (appropriately) puts as much or more of an emphasis on non-
scientific factors (e.g., politics, economics) as on scientific ones. Philip Boffey,
in the preface to his book about the National Academy of Sciences, a primary
source of technical expertise for the federal government, summed up the
problem succinctly. He wrote,
Ours is a society that believes in expertise, that constantly genuflects
before the presumed wisdom of experts.... The public tends to assume
that these expert advisers dispense some sort of objective truth, the
'right' answer to the problem under consideration. But such implicit
trust is misplaced. There are relatively few public policy questions
whose answers are purely technical (Boffey 1975).
1.1 From Divergence and Adversarial Standoffs...
Though there are signs of change, the atmosphere in which the United
States addresses environmental problems continues to be an adversarial one.
Competing interests, generally categorized as government, industry, and
environmental organizations, are locked in a continuous struggle to advance
their own agenda. Since the government and the environmental
organizations share a basic goal, protecting the environment, it would be easy
to assume that they would typically be affiliated in opposition to industry,
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whose primary goals are economic. But as we know, this is not the case. The
actions of governments are influenced by the shifting political winds, which
carry with them variable attitudes about what constitutes environmental
protection. More importantly, however, governments are likely to be caught
in the middle between the competing claims of industry and environmental
organizations, as both groups look to the government to sort through large
amounts of scientific as well as non-scientific data and to issue policies
favorable to their position.
The regulatory policy making process is characterized by what amounts
to a competition among the various stakeholding interests to make the best
case possible to those in policy making positions. Industry interests might use
economic arguments as well as scientific data from their own research efforts
to promote their views on the best course for environmental decision
making. Environmental groups or other non-governmental organizations
might also use the same kinds of arguments, only with markedly different
data or differing interpretations of the same data. The regulatory process may
involve any combination of government-sponsored hearings, studies, public
comment periods, or direct negotiations with stakeholders, all in an effort to
determine fact from fiction. When fact is not easily determined, the task
becomes making the best decision given the available information. It is easy
to see how this process can lead to a situation in which those with the best
access to the decision makers might have the ability to influence the kind of
dialogue that takes place and thereby influence the kinds of policies that are
proposed or enacted. Government relies as best it can on the advice it
receives from advisory boards, such as the EPA's Science Advisory Board or
those formed by the National Academy of Sciences, but given the uncertain
nature of the problems these bodies are asked to investigate, the same
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problems of access will still have a significant bearing on decision making
outcomes. Rather than viewing this situation as an indictment of
government, we view it as illustrative of the difficulties government decision
makers face in balancing purely rational policy making with the realities of
the policy making process.
Recent events in the effort to reauthorize the Clean Water Act,
particularly with regard to the issue of chlorine use, illustrate the kinds of
outcomes that result from the present system. In August 1993, Congress
received House Resolution 2898, the so-called "Chlorine Zero Discharge Act
of 1993." Despite the continuing debate regarding the manner in which
chlorine should be regulated (if at all), this bill was intended to put into law
the position of only one side of the debate. Under the proposed law, within
18 months of enactment a report would be required outlining the manner in
which zero discharge of organochlorine compounds could be achieved by the
pulp and paper industry; within five years of enactment, the pulp and paper
industry would be required to achieve zero discharge (U.S. Congress 1993). In
President Clinton's "Clean Water Initiative," the Administration called for a
policy that would give the EPA Administrator broad authority to "prohibit
the discharge of a toxic pollutant" like chlorine. Policies such as these, which
clearly favor the interests of some stakeholders over others, reflect the nature
of politics. However, when an issue as complicated as chlorine use is the
subject of those policies, there should be no doubt that these policies merely
set the stage for legal challenges by dissatisfied interests and other adversarial
roadblocks to successful policy making and policy implementation.
Kantrowitz (1976, 1977) and others have long been proponents of the
institutionalization of the adversarial process through the creation of
"science courts," arguing that this is the best way to ensure "the presumptive
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validity of the scientific input on which democratic decision making can be
based." Proponents of the science court state that the establishment of
scientific fact requires the elimination of all non-scientific questions (i.e.,
questions concerning values or political considerations, for example), an
outcome that is possible only in a judicial setting. Critics of these proposals
counter with numerous arguments, including the near impossibility of
achieving the separation of scientific questions from non-scientific questions;
even before a science court had begun its deliberations, non-scientific
considerations would have influenced the process through the selection of an
appropriate controversy to adjudicate (Casper 1976).
The science court has never taken hold as a policy making tool in the
United States, though Canada has used a formalized adversarial process in
recent years, apparently with some success (Dowd 1988). However, the success
of the science court is predicated on the ability to define explicit questions for
the court to answer. Today's environmental issues require simultaneous
consideration of many questions, not all of which are scientific in nature.
The growing recognition of this fact has led to the increasing reliance of
governments and others on non-adversarial, integrative problem solving
systems.
Negotiated rulemaking (or "reg neg") is an example of one such
system. The Environmental Protection Agency has adopted this form of
rulemaking for selected environmental disputes, allowing competing
interests to negotiate the wording of a proposed regulation so that the
typically adversarial comment period can be avoided.
The protocol of negotiated rulemaking is as follows. The Agency first
determines whether negotiation is appropriate, utilizing a neutral party to
conduct a feasibility analysis. This analysis includes an identification of the
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"materially affected" parties and assistance to those parties in determining if
negotiation might promote their interests. A number of questions are asked
in order to make this determination, including: Is the issue well enough
understood to make sound decisions? Is the issue's resolution subject to a
constraining deadline?; Is the outcome of the dispute really in doubt?; Do
the competing interests value the factors in the dispute differently? (i.e., are
mutually acceptable trades possible?); Are there a limited number of interests
involved? (a group of no more than 15 - 20 is preferred) (Harter 1982, 1986).
If the Agency accepts the issue as a candidate for negotiation, the
neutral party assumes the role of mediator and the parties begin a process to
produce a consensus proposal. This proposal becomes the rule on which the
Agency seeks public comment. The process then continues much as it would
without the initial negotiation; comments are received, the Agency indicates
its intention to form an advisory committee (pursuant to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act) to negotiate any changes to the proposal, and a
final Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is published in the Federal Register
(Harter 1986).
However, as Wald (1985) and others have pointed out, consensus is
never an easy goal to achieve and it is often difficult to ensure that all of the
interests are adequately represented in the consensus-building process. The
result is that "negotiation rarely eliminates court action altogether. [I]t only
changes the nature of the subsequent judicial proceedings" (Wald 1985).
1.2 ... Toward Convergence and Collaborative Solutions
Despite questions concerning its effectiveness, the negotiated rulemaking
process exemplifies a new trend in environmental problem solving. We see
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signs that there is continuing progress in the effort to minimize or eliminate
the contentiousness that makes environmental policy making so difficult.
Opposing interests see the value in pooling their resources and their data to
resolve their differences in a way that accomplishes environmental
protection without going so far as to drive interests from the process. The
following examples illustrate the growing recognition within the federal
government and among those who seek to influence policy making at this
level of the need for more cooperative and integrative approaches to
technical problem solving..
1.2.1 NIH Consensus Development Program
While consensus-building and multistakeholder problem solving
seem to be a phenomenon that has only recently found its way into the
mainstream, approaches of this sort are in fact not especially new to the
federal infrastructure. Since 1978 the Consensus Development Program
(CDP), administered by the Office of Medical Applications of Research
(OMAR) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), has provided a means to
evaluate the safety and efficacy of existing or emerging medical technologies.
At the heart of the CDP is the consensus conference, a gathering of
representatives from the medical profession, the scientific community, the
consuming public, and/or other interested stakeholders, in order to "improve
the translation of the results of medical research pertinent to health care into
information useful to the practicing community" (Perry and Kalberer 1980).
The NIH does not actively participate in the consensus conferences,
serving only to bring the various parties to the table. Each conference is
characterized by seven primary components: topic selection; planning
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committee formation; selection of appropriate questions, a conference panel,
and conference speakers; presentation of data; consensus development;
preparation of consensus statements; and dissemination of conference
outcomes (Institute of Medicine 1990, Lowe 1980).
The NIH selects topics for consensus conferences using criteria such as
public health importance, the existence of a controversy that is based on data
gaps, the feasibility of closing these gaps through a technical dialogue, and an
adequate scientific foundation on which to construct a dialogue. The
planning committee, comprising NIH staff and experts from outside the
federal government, defines a set of very specific questions to serve as the
conference focus. Generally, a conference is limited to four to six questions,
each of which must be potentially answerable on objective, scientific grounds.
The planning committee also nominates a conference panel, with the
emphasis placed on finding individuals who represent a broad range of
expertise (from researchers and health professionals to biostatisticians,
lawyers, and economists) and who have not published any work related to
the conference topic. During the two- to three-day conferences, the audience
(which generally numbers in the hundreds) hears testimony from a series of
experts. Panel members and the audience are invited to ask questions and
offer additional information; for every hour of presentations there is typically
one half hour of discussion. The panel adjourns to draft a consensus
statement at the end of the first day and again midway through the second
day, after the presentations are complete. On the third day, the panel chair
presents a draft statement to the speakers and audience. Comments and
suggestions for changes are then heard, and the panel adjourns to complete a
final draft. Results are communicated to the press by the end of the third day.
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The NIH also distributes the consensus statement extensively throughout the
health care system (Institute of Medicine 1990, Perry and Kalberer 1980).
Two years into the program, the NIH offered an assessment that
included the following observations:
* The detailed planning that goes into each consensus conference is
essential to the conferences' success, including the identification of
key issues and questions and the preparation of background
materials to provide to conference participants.
* The success of each conference depends on the participation of a
diverse audience. To this end, all conferences are free and open to
the public.
* Fears that health professionals would view consensus development
as inappropriate federal intervention in the medical practice have
been unfounded.
* Fears that consensus development would inhibit technological
innovation have also been unfounded. The inclusion in consensus
statements of a recommendation for additional research , especially
with regard to areas where the conference could not reach
consensus, has promoted technological innovation (Perry and
Kalberer 1980).
Because it has now been in existence for more than 15 years, the
Consensus Development Program has already provided a number of lessons
not only for those who would participate in the NIH program but also for
those who would organize or participate in any kind of technology-based,
consensus-building effort. As the authors of a recent evaluation of the NIH
CDP pointed out, "Although written specifically for the NIH Consensus
Development Program, the recommendations presented in this report
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address many of the challenges of any group process intended to produce a
consolidated, well-substantiated expert judgment for direct application to
policy making" (Institute of Medicine 1990).
More than 80 consensus conferences took place between 1978 and the
end of 1989 (Institute of Medicine 1990). Among the recommendations made
to improve future conferences were:
* The scope of inquiry of the NIH CDP should be expanded. The
program should seek to ensure that relevant economic, social, and
ethical aspects of assessing biomedical technologies and
management of clinical problems are appropriately addressed as
part of the consensus process.
* OMAR should develop an explicit ongoing research effort to
determine ways to improve the NIH CDP and to monitor the
impact of the program.
* The planning committee should publicly solicit questions
concerning a selected topic from a broad base of relevant
organizations and individuals, including OMAR advisory council
members (Institute of Medicine 1990).
It is also worth pointing out some of the thoughts that have been
published regarding the objective of producing a statement of consensus.
Writing in 1980, the acting Associate Director of OMAR noted that the CDP is
a complement to, and not a replacement for, the publication of research
findings in medical and other scientific journals. The CDP provides a means
to convey the most current thinking on a particular topic in a comprehensive
and ultimately useful way to those who would most benefit from that
information. There is also an explicit recognition of the fact that the
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information that comes out of a consensus conference, while the best
available at that time, is likely to be modified as the technical understanding
of the issue matures with time (Lowe 1980).
1.2.2 Carnegie Commission Reports
In 1988, the Carnegie Corporation formed the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology, and Government for the purpose of "helping
government institutions respond to the unprecedented advances in science
and technology that are transforming the world" (Carnegie Commission 1991,
1993). Between 1988 and 1993, the Commission published 19 reports,
including four that focused on environmental problem solving.' One of the
last of these reports, Risk and the Environment: Improving Regulatory
Decision Making, analyzes the way the federal government sets policy to deal
with environmental issues and suggests a number of improvements in the
existing system. At the heart of this report is the belief that "a more coherent,
efficient, and flexible regulatory decision making infrastructure" is needed to
tackle today's complex environmental issues (Carnegie Commission 1993).
1.2.3 National Institute for the Environment
I "E3 : Organizing for Environment, Energy, and the Economy in the Executive Branch of
the U.S. Government" (April 1990)
"International Environmental Research and Assessment: Proposals for Better
Organization and Decision Making " (July 1992)
"Environmental Research and Development: Strengthening the Federal Infrastructure"
(December 1992)
"Risk and the Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making" (June 1993)
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In December 1989, recognizing the need to coordinate environmental
research activities in the United States, a committee of scientists, educators,
and the general public representing academia, government, industry, and
environmental groups called for the creation of a National Institute for the
Environment (NIE). The mission of the NIE would be "to improve the
scientific basis for making decisions on environmental issues." As proposed,
the NIE would do for the environment what the National Institutes of
Health has done for human health: sponsor research, propose solutions to
difficult problems, and ensure that decision makers have access to the best
available information (Hubbell 1993).
The NIE would complement, rather than supplant, the existing federal
agencies that conduct environmental research. Proponents cite two critical
reasons why there is a pressing need for this integrative agency: the lack of a
"coherent system for assessing, interpreting, and actively communicating
knowledge about the environment" to those who would make
environmentally critical decisions, and the lack of multidisciplinary focus
that results from the fragmentation of current environmental research efforts
among an array of federal agencies. The NIE would integrate research,
assessment, information, and education and training functions, though the
focus would be on research. The formation of three Directorates
(Environmental Resources, Environmental Systems, and Environmental
Sustainability) would allow the NIE to focus on problem-based rather than
discipline-based research. This organizational principle is critical given the
multidisciplinary nature of environmental problems and the great difficulty
with which existing agencies are able to influence policy making through
coordinated, scientific arguments (CNIE 1993).
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Progress toward the creation of the NIE has been slow but steady.
Within four months after the first formal articulation of the concept for the
agency in 1989, House and Senate committees had held hearings on the
merits of the proposal. In the following year, Congress appropriated $400,000
to the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a feasibility study under the
sponsorship of the Environmental Protection Agency. The National Science
Foundation, Department of Interior, and Department of Energy contributed
an additional $200,000 to the study. The NAS assessment, released in June
1993, called the NIE concept "a credible and effective view of a means to
organize environmental research." In August 1993, a bill (H.R. 2918) to
officially establish a National Institute for the Environment made it to the
House floor (CNIE 1993, Hubbell 1993).
More pressing domestic policy issues are likely to stall the progress of
H.R. 2918, but the proposal received a boost in March 1994 when Dr. Richard
Benedick assumed the presidency of the committee organizing the NIE effort.
Benedick is known for his work drafting the Montreal Protocol, which is
precisely the type of international, collaborative outcome that supporters
believe the NIE can foster (Stevens 1994). A meeting held in Washington in
late March 1994 is evidence that the concepts articulated by NIE supporters are
being heard and taken seriously, though there is now some question as to
whether the NIE will become a reality. The meeting involved the National
Science and Technology Council's Committee on Environment and Natural
Resources (NSTC/CENR) and focused on the future course of federal
environmental research. [The NSTC is the newly-formed, Cabinet-level
successor to the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and
Technology (FCCSET).] While encouraged by the fact that their ideas have
gained the attention of the White House, NIE supporters are concerned that
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the Administration appears to be proposing to coordinate federal
environmental research and development programs through the
NSTC/CENR rather than through an independent agency like the NIE
(Thomas, Howe, and Geraghty 1994).
1.2.4 Office of Technology Assessment Report
In January 1994, the Office of Technology Assessment published a
report entitled "Industry, Technology, and the Environment: Competitive
Challenges and Business Opportunities." This report, one of several OTA has
published in recent years examining the technological ramifications of
growing environmental concerns, focuses on the challenges faced by U.S.
firms who are either providers of environmental technologies or who are
manufacturers faced with the competing demands of environmental
compliance and international competition. The second chapter of this report,
"Issues and Options," includes the identification of several issue areas. One
of these areas is "Regulatory Reform and Innovation." Among the options
suggested to address this general issue is the following:
Congress could fund an Institute for Environmental
Cooperation to promote innovative cooperative efforts between
industry, environmental groups, or other nongovernmental
organizations, and government. The institute could be a forum for
collaboration, bringing various parties together to explore new
approaches and to craft new solutions. Moreover, the institute could
study innovative cooperative efforts and disseminate lessons learned
from these approaches (OTA 1994).
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The OTA authors then go on to say, "Universities could also serve as forums
for consensus building and collaboration." They cite as an example of this
kind of effort the chlorine studies now ongoing at MIT and suggest that
efforts like this could be supported by an Institute for Environmental
Cooperation (OTA 1994).
The previous examples demonstrate that the desire for new problem
solving approaches is real and exists at the highest levels of government.
However, ideas, proposals, or plans that focus on improving environmental
problem solving through government reorganization seem to miss the
important point that the government is only one of many stakeholders.
Adversarial situations are not likely to disappear if the problem solving
process continues to require government in the leading role. The OTA report
is evidence of the recognition that the university, though possibly a
stakeholder itself, can play an important role in the evolution of more
integrative problem solving systems that exist outside of the existing
government structure. We turn now to a more detailed examination of that
role.
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CHAPTER 2 - EVALUATING THE UNIVERSIT1YS SOCIAL ROLE
If our intention is to propose a new role for the research university in
the pursuit of lasting solutions to complicated environmental problems, then
it is necessary to discuss, briefly and generally, the ability of the academic
institution to engage in activities that are designed to have an effect beyond
the university's walls. Before doing so, however, we would like to define
more specifically what we mean when we use the term "university."
This thesis examines the role the research university, and specifically
MIT, has played and could continue to play in the environmental problem
solving arena. MIT is a unique institution in that it commands respect
throughout the world as a source of technical expertise in a variety of fields,
but it is by no means the only institution of its kind that could take on this
role. In fact, other research universities should be encouraged not only to
participate in dialogues constructed at MIT, but also to construct other
dialogues in which members of the MIT community would be able to
participate. Other, non-technically oriented institutions of higher education
will also contribute important players to these dialogues, since research
universities by no means have a monopoly on expertise and input from the
leading academic minds on an issue will be vital to the success of any of these
efforts. However, our focus is on the research university because of the
technical perspective from which we view environmental problem solving
needs.
When it is proposed that a university lend its expertise to a difficult
policy question, it is generally the case that the university as an institution is
not being asked to enter a public debate, but rather some small segment of a
much larger university community. This segment can be as simple as a
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single researcher with a unique knowledge of or perspective on the problem
at hand, who, acting as an academic "entrepreneur," might actively offer the
university's resources as a tool for problem solving. Or, the segment could
comprise a large group of people representing multiple disciplines and
departments. And while the university administration must at least
implicitly support the university representatives' efforts, the substance of the
ensuing dialogue should not be assumed to represent a particular philosophy
or set of opinions held by "the university."
In this context, an important question to address (if not answer) is
whether a redefinition of the societal function of the research university is
required if the university is to catalyze, organize, or otherwise lead the effort
to find solutions to complex environmental problems. This question is one
that both the university itself and those who interact with the university
community (government, industry, the public) must address. Within the
university, those who would commit to such an undertaking should ask
whether it is possible for them to assume the roles of both educator and
intervenor, and to be explicit about when each role is being played. Outside
the university, interested parties should ask whether they are comfortable
with the dual role offered by the university.
MIT as an institution is clear in its resolve not only to foster the
highest levels of basic scientific research, but also to apply the scientific and
technical knowledge that results. Whether the university should be an agent
of societal change is a question that has been the subject of some debate. Nash
writes of the three models of university service: the "ivory tower, " the
"service station," and the "activist." An ivory tower university is one that
engages in basic research but does not try to intervene in matters of public
policy. A "service station" university conducts applied research and assists
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both government and industry when called upon to provide "expert" advice.
The "activist" university takes it upon itself to identify and seek solutions to
societal problems (Nash 1988). As Nash describes, with its motto of mens et
manus (mind and hand) MIT fits the description of a service station
university.
The role we envision for MIT, that of the initiator of a policy or
decision making dialogue among multiple stakeholders, might seem to be
getting too far away from the primary objective of the Institute, which is
conducting research. However, convening a group of people representing a
number of interests in order to seek solutions is in fact a form of university
research; it is a precursor to the formal research efforts that might take place
in the laboratory or in the field. Before traditional applied research can be
undertaken, it is necessary to pose the right questions and make sure that the
ensuing effort is both useful and timely.
The concept of conducting process-oriented research, such as this, at a
research university is not novel. In 1969, Erich Jantsch, a visiting research
associate at MIT's Sloan School of Management, wrote a manuscript entitled
"Integrative Planning for the 'Joint Systems' of Society and Technology -- The
Emerging Role of the University." After defining what he saw as the three
functions of a university (education of students, the enrichment of scientific
knowledge through research, and service to the community), Jantsch
expanded upon the research function. He saw a four step "enrichment of the
dimensions of research," in which basic research and applied research gave
way to "research in the organization of scientific and technological
knowledge" (Jantsch 1969).
Many have also recognized the expanded role that the university could
play in dealing with the problems faced by modern society. Wolfle (1972)
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outlined three of the many reasons why "society needs to have the university
conduct research": to educate students, to continue the education and
maintain the competence of faculty, and to provide "informed and objective"
social criticism. Wolfle goes on to state that "the most difficult policy
questions are likely to center around the university's responsibility for
multidisciplinary research on large problems of great social importance." In a
commentary published in 1979, Robert Marshak, then president of the City
College of New York, presented the thesis that:
... the impact of science and technology on our post-industrial global
society is so great that unless our universities are willing to accept
much greater responsibility for applied multidisciplinary research on
the larger societal problems, more and more of our social decision
making will be based on the self-serving needs of government and
industry, the blandishments of well-intentioned but uninformed
citizens' groups and the pervasive emotionalism of the mass media.
The present-day American university is the prime institution where
intellectual discourse and research remain relatively free of political
pressure and ideological expediency; one might therefore enquire
whether these beneficent conditions that have been so conducive to
outstanding American performance in pure science would also
improve American performance in certain types of applied research
(Marshak 1979).
Marshak also wrote of his belief that "a university or consortium of
universities [is] the most appropriate mechanism for mounting an attack on
those problems that transcend national boundaries . . ." and that "the burden
of global challenges mandates that the American scientific-academic
community attempt to balance the celebration of scientific creation with the
application of scientific knowledge to societal needs . . ." (Marshak 1979).
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Others are quick to contest an expanded university role, saying that the
university is not equipped to address complex, multidisciplinary
sociotechnological problems. Weinberg (1971) wrote "[t]he universities fall
short because they are fragmented and disciplinary. It therefore seems to me
that society will have to invent new institutions that can apply science to the
broad socio-technological problems of the future." The idea of a university as
a place where research is conducted "relatively free of political pressure and
ideological expediency," as Marshak wrote, is also a contested one. Ashford
(1983) and others point to the pressures faced by university researchers to
direct their efforts toward those objectives that will help them secure funding,
thereby detracting from the university's goal of seeking and transmitting
"pure" knowledge. As we will discuss later, these external pressures may also
stand in the way of a university operating as an "honest broker," or a "neutral
facilitator," services which are typically those sought when academia enters
into a public debate.
The arguments both for and against university intervention or
participation in social decision making can be very persuasive. We feel that
the resources of the university, in particular the research university, will be
critical elements in any solution to complex environmental problems.
Therefore, we propose that any discussion of the university's role focus solely
on the one attribute that is shared by all universities and all institutions of
higher learning: education. Above all, a university is dedicated to the
acquisition and transmission of knowledge. The education of the
university's students must always be the foremost priority, regardless of the
framework within which this education is provided. Most students who earn
undergraduate or advanced degrees, whether they attend an "ivory tower" or
a "service station" or an "activist" university, will eventually leave the
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academic community and apply the knowledge they have gained to societal
objectives of their own choosing.
This process of taking in, educating, and returning is equally applicable
to the interaction the university has with those who are not matriculated
students but rather are representatives of government or industry or non-
governmental organizations. When these people attend a conference or
workshop at a university like MIT, the goal should be to provide a forum in
which knowledge is shared. Each of the participants is potentially both a
student and a teacher, a model that fits easily within the universally accepted
role of the university as a place of education.
Finally, it is not our intention to propose an expanded university role
designed to supplant existing systems of policy making. Rather, the service
provided by a research university in the effort to find solutions to
environmental problems is intended to complement these systems. Through
the provision of a forum for interaction and education, we seek only to
enhance the abilities of stakeholders to move toward their objectives in a
manner that earns the respect and trust of all interested parties.
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CHAPTER 3 - CONVENING STAKEHOLERS: FOUR MIT EXAMPLES
3.0 Introduction
This chapter contains descriptions of four efforts organized by MIT
faculty and staff to create problem-focused dialogues among stakeholding
interests. The MIT Workshop on Industrial Ecology and the Steel Industry
(November 1993) provided an opportunity for steel manufacturers and others
to explore possibilities for technological innovation in the face of the
environmental demands confronting the industry. The Waste Incineration
Conference (June 1988) put MIT in the role of neutral facilitator in an attempt
to reconcile long-standing conflicts. The MIT International Conferences on
the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Technology (October 1990 and October
1993) brought together representatives of numerous interests (of which MIT
was one) to examine not only the technological needs and possibilities in the
nuclear energy industry but also the problems associated with the loss of
confidence among the U.S. public regarding nuclear energy. The conference
entitled "Design and Disposal of Durable Products: What's the Best Route?"
(March 1993) again saw MIT in the role of convener, though with far more
stakeholders and a less clear cut framework in which to conduct a dialogue.
The selection of these four projects is based on their timeliness (all occurred
within the last five years) as well as for their differences with regard to the
scope of each project's problem focus. The order in which we will present
them (steel, incineration, nuclear energy, durables) shows a progression from
a smaller number of stakeholders and a relative lack of uncertainty
surrounding technology-oriented questions to a large number of potential
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stakeholders and a great deal of uncertainty about the technological questions
that need to be asked.
The description of each project is intended only to provide insight as to
the role MIT played in defining and executing the dialogue. Therefore, the
descriptions are relatively short. For the organizers of each project, the
substance of the meeting was more important than the issues that we intend
to explore, so there is not a large amount of data to evaluate. However, in
speaking with the organizers and reviewing the available documentation
(including feedback from participants in some cases), a picture of the
university role and the way it can evolve begins to emerge. Each example
consists of two parts. The first describes the purpose, organization, and
execution of the meeting, including such topics as conceptualization,
participant identification and invitation processes, and agenda structure and
implementation. The second part is a discussion of the important factors
associated with the meeting as they relate to MIT's ability to play a useful role
in the dialogue.
3.1 Workshop on Industrial Ecology and the Steel Industry (November 1993)
3.1.1 Description
At the invitation of faculty in the MIT Materials Processing Center (a
research group within the Department of Materials Science and Engineering),
approximately 60 people representing the steel industry, the federal
government, and the academic community convened at MIT in November
1993 to participate in a Workshop on Industrial Ecology and the Steel
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Industry. 2 As stated in the letter of invitation to the participants, the
workshop was intended to "identify technological issues that will be of
concern to the steel industry in the year 2005" and to "determine to what
extent academic research can address any of these issues." The conference had
an environmental focus, with particular attention paid to the concept of
industrial ecology.
The MIT faculty who initiated the workshop did so with two objectives
in mind. First was the desire to employ the resources available at MIT
(faculty, graduate students) to assist the industry in adapting technologically
to the regulatory and environmental realities of the late 20th- and early 21st-
century. A second and equally important objective was to reestablish MIT as a
leading center of basic steel making process research.
The need for a steel industry workshop came strictly from the
legislative and regulatory realities facing the steel producers. The Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 and other existing statutes created a set of absolute
guidelines that in a sense dictate the future of the industry. As a result, steel
manufacturers find themselves in a position where technological innovation
is a necessary means of protection against future liabilities.
For the MIT Department of Materials Science and Engineering, the
workshop provided an opportunity to develop a list of potential research
projects and to begin the process of gaining the support of the steel industry
for the concept of a Center of Excellence for environmentally sensitive
research. Such a Center, based at MIT or elsewhere, would allow the
coordination of research efforts among universities nationwide.
2 Information for the following discussion was obtained through conversation with Professor
Donald Sadoway, MIT Department of Materials Science and Engineering, as well as through
documents provided by Professor Sadoway related to the Workshop. Professor Sadoway
initiated the effort to put the Workshop together.
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Attendance at the workshop was by invitation only, limited to
representatives of the steel industry, academia, and government agencies
who have a technical knowledge of steel making processes. The MIT
organizers enlisted the support of the American Iron and Steel Institute
(AISI) in advance of sending out formal invitations, primarily as a means of
attracting the major industry interests. MIT organizers chose to deal directly
with the technical community at AISI despite the existence of other interests
within that organization (legal, lobbying) who are actively involved in the
issues to be addressed at the workshop. In this way, the workshop focus could
not be construed as anything other than a technology-oriented approach to
finding solutions to difficult questions. A planning group of MIT and AISI
representatives determined which stakeholding interests should be invited.
MIT and AISI then collaborated in the creation of an invitation list; AISI
made recommendations for industry representation, while MIT focused on
academia. While they did not include every possible interest (environmental
groups and certain foreign producers are examples of those who were not
contacted), the organizers were satisfied that for their purposes the relevant
stakeholders were invited. According to the workshop organizers, no
invitations were declined for any reason other than scheduling conflicts, and
in fact people who expressed interest in participating were turned away in
order to keep the workshop relatively small (Sadoway 1994). Representatives
of the federal government (EPA, DoE, Bureau of Mines, NIST) were
encouraged to attend and were consulted during the planning process,
though they were not given specific roles to play during the workshop.
In keeping with the stated intent of the workshop, there were four
detailed technical sessions over the course of two days. The session topics
dealt with recycling, waste disposal, waste treatment, and "clean"
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technologies3 . Each session began with an invited speaker followed by a
discussion. The speaker was asked to provide a framework within which to
discuss the technical issues in greater detail. An assigned discussion leader
was joined in each session by three or four industry representatives who have
an expertise in the area of the session's technical focus.
According to a workshop organizer, the individual sessions were
planned so that the discussion time was at least as long as the time allotted for
the initial presentation. Participants were thereby encouraged to participate
and not to attend simply to listen to what others had to say about the future of
the industry. Audience participation was facilitated through the use of
comment sheets that asked for opinions on the session's key points, gaps in
the discussion, relative priorities of the issues raised (or not raised),
opportunities for university-based research to address any of these issues, and
suggestions for additional follow-up work.
Of equal importance to the technical sessions were the scheduled
informal breaks in the proceedings. Of the 11 hours allotted for the
workshop, four were set aside as opportunities for informal, one-on-one
discussions among participants or for more general group discussion. These
breaks were especially helpful in fostering the exchange of ideas and concerns
across interests (especially between industry and the government).
A report on the proceedings of the Steel Workshop is not yet available,
and there was no public record of the proceedings in order to encourage an
open and productive dialogue among the participants. A Blue Ribbon
3 The titles of the four technical sessions were:
"Dealing with Tramp Elements to Allow Recycling;"
"Efficient Disposal/Recycling of Slag, Dusts, and Sludges;"
"Application of High-Temperature Reactors to the Treatment of Industrial Waste;"and
"Clean Technologies"
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commission is in the process of preparing a summary of the workshop
findings.
3.1.2 Discussion
The Steel Workshop does not represent a gathering intended to
address a set of highly complex questions posed by stakeholders from all of
the major potential interest groups. The absence of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or what might be generally categorized as
representatives of the general public does not reflect an incompleteness in the
dialogue. There are two reasons why this is true. First, many of the concerns
that would be brought to the table by such groups, primarily the
environmental consequences of steel making, have already been addressed
through legislation and therefore may not be a current priority for those
outside the industry or relevant government regulatory bodies. Had the
workshop included non-technical factors, such as the effects of technological
innovation on the steel industry workforce, then other stakeholding interests
would have been appropriate for inclusion. However, since the focus on
technology was well-defined in advance of the workshop, the interests
represented were sufficiently inclusive. The second reason, related to the
first, is that a goal of the workshop was to define a research agenda based on
the perceived needs of the steel industry. Presumably, any issues that might
arise as a result of ensuing technological developments could be addressed in
another forum defined for that purpose.
The success of attracting major industry stakeholders to the workshop
is evident in the fact that the chief executives of the two largest integrated
steel mills and the two largest mini-mills agreed to speak at the workshop's
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opening session. According to an MIT organizer, the high caliber of steel
industry representation was the result of two factors: the reputation of MIT as
a place where serious discussion of technological issues can occur and the
explicit support of an important industry organization (the American Iron
and Steel Institute). Another factor that influenced the ability of MIT
organizers to attract the desired participants was that the workshop
was clearly focused on processes rather than products. Few if any would
argue that the problems associated with the steel industry require replacing
steel with other materials. Steel manufacturers did not need to fear that they
would find themselves defending their industry and fighting off calls for
actions that might threaten their profits or even their economic viability.
MIT organizers believe that federal government officials were drawn to the
workshop by the caliber of representation from the steel industry, even
though they had no formal role during the workshop sessions.
We have reviewed the comment sheets completed by the participants,
and from them we can begin to see the potential for a university like MIT to
actively participate in important, technology-based dialogues concerning the
formulation of public policy. In particular, participants viewed the university
as an institution that can facilitate policy making by assuming an
intermediary role between government, industry, and the public (including
environmental groups). The terms used to describe the university included
"unbiased arbiter," "credible," "reasoned," "independent," and "honest
broker;" participants described the role of the university as "education,"
"communication," and "translation." Workshop participants provided
general visions of the kind of follow-up work that the university might
undertake, revolving around the theme of developing a broader dialogue
that includes not only different perspectives on steel technology but also
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expertise on the non-technical factors that drive technology decisions (MPC
1993).
3.2 Waste Incineration Conference (June 1988)
3.2.1 Description
The Hazardous Substances Management Program in the Center for
Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development at MIT was designed to
provide a collaborative forum in which problems related to the introduction
of hazardous chemicals into the environment can be addressed. One of the
first efforts of the HSMP was to organize a conference around the problem of
waste incineration. The Waste Incineration Conference took place on June 13
and 14, 1988, bringing together the primary stakeholders in an ongoing and
often contentious debate concerning both regulatory policy and the siting of
new incinerators.
MIT organizers were interested in promoting action through the use of
the resources and expertise that a university can provide. Immediate
solutions to the incineration problems were not expected, nor were they
necessarily a goal of the conference. Rather, the HSMP organizers sought a
focus on "taking steps which allow the parties involved to learn, to cooperate,
and to create new possibilities." Furthermore, the intention of the organizers
was to have MIT (that is, the HSMP) "act as a neutral convener" (Ehrenfeld et
al 1988).
Prior to the conference, HSMP researchers prepared a comprehensive
report that framed the issues in dispute. The report was circulated to the
invited participants in order to ensure that all interests were portrayed fairly
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and accurately. The purpose of this report was to provide something that
"would allow the participants to converse with a shared understanding of
each other's concerns" (Ehrenfeld et al 1988). The methods employed by
HSMP in preparing the report included an extensive literature review of
scientific papers, interest group position papers, testimony, articles, and other
relevant materials; interviews with parties to a local incinerator siting
dispute; and an analysis of the data in order to identify recurring themes that
would help focus the dialogue at the conference. Participants were invited to
comment on the position papers in advance of the conference.
The invitation to the conference specified four objectives:
* To bring together people who disagree about the need for
incinerators, their safety, and the fairness of decisions.
* To clarify and understand the sources of the disagreements by
holding up a mirror to everyone's views.
* To create a setting in which the participants, through an open
dialogue, can explore options that will lead to action.
* To leave with a commitment to pursue the agreements which
emerge from the conference.
The invitation further outlined that the "primary output" of the conference
was to be "agreements and commitments," and that MIT intended "to
provide an aegis for on-going dialogue" following the conference.
Approximately 30 invitations were sent to representatives of government,
industry, environmental and community groups, academia, and professional
societies. In developing the invitation list, the primary objective of the MIT
organizers was to include representation from all stakeholding interests. Of
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the 22 participants who accepted the invitation and attended the conference,
six represented environmental or community groups (at the local, state, and
national levels), four came from professional groups or academia (not
including the MIT organizers), five were state or federal government
representatives, and seven came from industry. While MIT organizers were
somewhat concerned that key participants in the debate had declined
invitations, they were satisfied that the final group represented all of the
perspectives that needed to be part of a dialogue. Participants were not
generally aware of the original invitation list, but some, noting the absence of
particular people, did seek reassurance that no one had been intentionally
excluded. In most cases, organizers had in fact invited the people in question,
leading the organizers to feel that the group was satisfied with the makeup of
the group (Nash 1994a).
A set of groundrules were laid down at the beginning of the conference
in order to promote an open dialogue rather than a positional debate.
Participants were asked to stress the positive, to speak as individuals and not
as organization representatives, to explain why they disagreed with a point or
a position, and to seek consensus. The conference proceeded as a series of
facilitated dialogues; facilitation was even included as part of the dinner on
the first night as a means of setting the agenda for the second day, which had
intentionally been left open to allow participants to decide which issues were
the most important.
One month after the conference, each participant received a copy of an
"Agenda for Action," which summarized the major points of discussion and
the potential areas of agreement (see Appendix 1). The organizers asked for
edits, additional suggestions, and opinions on the three most important
issues to come out of the conference. In December 1988, the participants
45
received the revised Agenda for Action as well as a "Next Steps Opinion
Survey." The survey asked the participants whether they would be willing to
incorporate prescriptions from the conference into their organization's
positions or actions, if they would support an effort to develop a public
statement summarizing the conference's key ideas, if they would like to
attend another conference to examine one particular issue (and what that
issue should be), and if they had any suggestions for continuing the dialogue.
3.2.2 Discussion
The Waste Incineration Conference stands out as an explicit attempt by
academia to step into a complicated, technical controversy as a neutral
interest with the objective of facilitating consensus among the identified
stakeholders. The reaction to the university's stated role and objectives both
prior to and following the conference is worth noting. As they developed the
invitation list, HSMP researchers encountered skepticism from numerous
parties. Among those who hesitated or declined to accept invitations were
environmental groups who felt that any agreement with industry was
impossible, a local citizen group who stated that their opposition to
incineration was "non-negotiable," and a government representative whose
unfamiliarity with the HSMP resulted in skepticism about the program's
motives (Ehrenfeld et al 1989). Even with these reservations, however,
HSMP organizers were successful in convening a group that represented the
diversity of stakeholding interests (Nash 1993a).
Immediately following the conference, some of the participants offered
evaluations of the conference proceedings and results. While not everyone
was polled, reaction was sought from each of the stakeholder groups. From
46
conversations with six participants (representing six different interests), two
distinct themes emerged. The first concerned the stated goal of reaching some
kind of consensus on the way to approach the incineration issue. Although
consensus never emerged, one participant noted that "that's pretty much
what we all expected anyway." Another participant said that it was "naive to
think we could reach consensus," and a third left the conference skeptical that
incineration is a resolvable dispute. The second theme, which may be related
to the first, was a feeling that participants were holding back from really
engaging in a debate. One participant felt that it was "too bad" that the
conference was "structured to avoid direct negotiation," while another said
that "people seemed tight." A third participant thought the agenda was "too
polite" and that "everyone was walking on eggshells" (Nash 1988).
A second important characteristic of this conference was the amount of
pre-conference research undertaken by the HSMP organizers. Recognizing
that a complicated, multistakeholder issue could not be adequately addressed
in two days without some initial focus, the positions of the interests were
carefully documented by HSMP researchers. As a result, the conference was
able to avoid posturing and the use of valuable time simply to reestablish the
fact that there was disagreement among the stakeholders.
Finally, as it was a stated goal of the HSMP to "provide an aegis for the
ongoing dialogue," it is useful to examine what happened when attempts
were made to do so. The first opportunity to continue the dialogue came
when the Agenda for Action was distributed for comments and revisions.
Thirteen of the 22 participants responded, some noting specifically that there
is a need for this group of interests to meet on more occasions and to keep the
dialogue going. The Next Steps Opinion Survey brought 11 responses, all
indicating a willingness or desire to attend another conference focused on a
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particular issue. However, there did not appear to be any agreement on what
that issue should be. Perhaps of equal significance to the apparent unanimity
of the respondents in favor of continuing a dialogue is the fact that many of
the participants chose not to respond at all.
3.3 International Conference on the Next Generation of Nuclear Power
Technology (October 1993 and October 1994)
3.3.1 Description
In October 1993, the MIT Program in Advanced Nuclear Studies hosted
its second International Conference on the Next Generation of Nuclear Power
Technology.4 Both this conference and the first, held in October 1990, offered
an opportunity for representatives from many stakeholding groups to explore
technological issues as well as social concerns regarding the use of nuclear
power. A goal of both conferences was to foster "a common understanding"
and "to assist the process of communication among various interest groups."
The focus of the second conference was somewhat different from the first. As
stated in the proceedings of the 1990 conference, its purpose "was to aid the
process of reaching a greater consensus concerning acceptable technologies"
for the next generation of nuclear reactors. By the time the second conference
was held, it had become apparent that the technical questions regarding
future technologies were no longer the most crucial. In their place were
questions of public trust and the ability of the nuclear industry to define its
role in the 21st century. In both cases, the conference focused on the
4 Information for the following discussion was obtained through conversation with Professor
Michael Golay and Sarah Abdel-Kader of the MIT Program in Advanced Nuclear Power
Studies, as well as through documents provided by Professor Golay related to the Conference.
Professor Golay initiated the effort to put the Conference together.
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questions that organizers considered the most important at the time. The
shift in focus is evident in the titles given to the individual conference
sessions; the titles for the first conference were primarily titles of technical
papers, whereas the titles for the second were a series of questions.5 MIT
organizers hoped that by bringing together all of the participants in the
nuclear energy debate, the nuclear power industry would gain a much clearer
picture of the realities that it faces.
A goal of the conference organizers was to have representation from as
many perspectives as possible. The nuclear energy debate is fairly well
established, so there was relatively little difficulty in ensuring that an interest
group had not been left out. Some difficulty was encountered, however, in
attracting all of the desired interests. Environmental NGOs were somewhat
skeptical of the idea of having a meaningful dialogue with proponents of
nuclear energy, but they were ultimately convinced to attend on the basis of
the value their perspectives would bring to the conference. For both
conferences, the invitation list was developed primarily by the organizers in
the Program for Advanced Nuclear Studies based on their personal contacts
and knowledge of the important players in the ongoing dialogue. An
international perspective was ensured through the participation of
5 The eight technical sessions in 1990 were entitled: 1) Advanced nuclear power options: the
driving forces and their results; 2) Modularization as an avenue to economic competitiveness; 3)
Nuclear power public and utility acceptance issues in the United States; 4) Nuclear power
public and utility acceptance in some other countries; 5) Audiences, rationales, and
quantitative measures for demonstration of nuclear safety and licensing by tests; 6) Public
preferences and risk perceptions; 7) Nuclear waste disposal; and
8) Use of fast-spectrum reactors for HLW burning.
Technical session titles in 1993 were: 1) What role should nuclear power play, and what would
life be without it? 2) How long will the current nuclear power reactors operate? 3) Can nuclear
power gain public acceptance? 4) What role should renewable energy technology play; what
would life be like with them? 5) What to do about nuclear weapons proliferation, and do new
reactors to consume plutonium make sense? 6) What will happen to our nuclear wastes? 7)
What should our future nuclear energy strategy be?
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stakeholders from Italy, Holland, Germany, Japan, and Korea. Participants
were asked to enter into the dialogue on the basis of their own opinions and
not as representatives of the organizations or interests from which they came
(Abdel Kader 1994).
Each of the two conferences proceeded as a series of focused sessions
with a presentation by an invited speaker followed by remarks from a
respondant and a group discussion. The topics for each session were
formulated by the MIT organizers and revised numerous times based on
conversations with invited participants in advance of the conference.
Organizers were able to establish general agreement on the questions in
advance.
The Program for Advanced Nuclear Studies published a detailed
summary of the proceedings, including reports from a rapporteur, following
the first conference. As of this writing, organizers had not yet completed the
summary of the proceedings of the second conference.
3.3.2 Discussion
The nuclear energy dialogue stands out as the only example of the four
presented here that has been carried over to a second gathering of the
stakeholders. Besides the significance of the MIT organizers' ability to sustain
a dialogue, the two conferences illustrate how a dialogue changes as issues
become more clearly defined, as old questions are answered, and as new
questions arise. The first conference was intended to address, in a technical
manner, the future of nuclear energy systems. However, as noted in the
Proceedings from that conference, "[t]he most common theme throughout
the Conference was the current lack of public acceptance and confidence in
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the nuclear power program in the U.S. A great deal of discussion focused on
probable causes and possible cures" (Golay 1990). In the three years prior to
the second conference, it became clear to the major stakeholders that the
technical issues paled in comparison to the more fundamental issue of public
trust and whether there would ever be any need for advanced nuclear
technologies. As a result, organizers designed the agenda for the second
conference in a way that took into account the new realities of the issue,
including framing each session in the form of a question.
As difficult as the questions concerning the future of nuclear energy are
for participants to try to answer, they do have the advantage of a longer
timeframe for their deliberations. Stakeholders recognize that if nuclear
energy is to become a major part of U.S. energy production, it is not likely to
do so until at least some time early in the next century. This reality stands in
contrast to other environmental issues, including those discussed in this
chapter, that are subject to more immediate concerns and a need to formulate
policy relatively quickly. The longer time horizon is a double-edged sword,
however, since the ability to have a more thoughtful and deliberate dialogue
is tempered by the fact that those who have responsibility for making policy
decisions today will have less to contribute (Golay 1994).
MIT's role in this dialogue differed in one important respect from the
incineration and, as we will describe, the durables dialogues. While serving
in the role of convener, the Program in Advanced Nuclear Power Studies,
like the Materials Processing Center involved in the steel dialogue, had a very
real interest in the future direction of nuclear energy policy. MIT organizers
made sure, both before and during the workshops, that the participants
understood the university's role as an active dialogue participant and not just
as a facilitator. According to the principal organizer, participants were more
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interested in a fair process than in an objective university role. The
university's intention was to "shape an intellectual agenda" and not to serve
as a "near-term change agent" (Golay 1994). At least some success toward this
end was achieved, as noted by the rapporteur for the first conference when he
wrote, "... we are opening a dialogue. The written positions of different
interest groups look very harsh and inflexible. Now with dialogue
developing, the potentially acceptable positions look more flexible. Openness
in this process is the key to success" (Golay 1990).
Another significant characteristic of the nuclear energy dialogue was
the level of international representation desired and achieved by the
organizers. Through the creation of a multinational dialogue, U.S.
participants had the opportunity to see that citizens of other countries view
nuclear energy issues differently. As a result, U.S. stakeholders can now
approach the issues in a broader context and can learn from the experiences of
other nations. At the same time, participation in this conference gave
international participants a new perspective on the ways to approach
multistakeholder conflicts in their own countries, where it may not be as easy
to involve stakeholders in a joint effort to supplement the policy making
process.
3.4 Design and Disposal of Durable Products: What's the Best Route? (March 1993)
3.4.1 Description
On March 24 and 25, 1993, the Center for Technology, Policy, and
Industrial Development (CTPID) at MIT sponsored a conference entitled
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"Design and Disposal of Durable Products: What's the Best Route?" The
impetus for this conference came from two issues that combine questions of
both technology and policy, and therefore fit within the research of the
Center. The first issue is the solid waste "crisis," namely the dwindling space
available to dispose of waste material. Because of their size and the lack of
existing recycling programs, durable goods (such as automobiles and
refrigerators) are a significant part of the solid waste problem. The second
issue that makes durables an appropriate focus for a CTPID conference is the
amount of natural resources used in the manufacturing and especially in the
use of these products. There is a growing belief that this resource use is not
sustainable and that practices must be instituted in the near term to ensure
adequate resource conservation.
The broad theme of the conference was "how to create an effective
public policy framework to address [the environmental impacts of durable
products]." Three objectives were outlined by CTPID in advance of the
gathering:
* To assess, from the point of view of representatives of all the major
stakeholding groups, the strengths and weaknesses of the different
approaches to fostering "green" durable products.
* To produce a written statement of principles to guide those
responsible for developing future U.S. public and private policy in
this area.
* To design a process for continued environmental policy dialogue on
durable products among all concerned interest groups (CTPID 1993).
The CTPID organizers decided that the dialogue would focus on the
automobile and electronics industries. These industries already face the
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challenge of complying with recycling initiatives in Europe, which has
generated interest among industry leaders in the U.S. to begin looking at
issues such "extended producer responsibility" and "green" products (Nash
1994b). The conference attracted 93 participants representing 14 electronics
companies, 10 automobile companies, nine federal and state government
agencies, seven non-governmental organizations, six suppliers, six
universities, five consulting companies, four professional societies, two
recycling companies, and one invited member of the press.
Organizers developed the invitation list in a variety of ways. Trade
association rosters and a participation list from a previous EPA conference
with a similar theme provided an initial set of names. Other names were
added when organizers asked key players from environmental groups, the
EPA, and the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program for their suggestions.
The Business and Environment newsletter provided a forum in which to
publicize the conference and attract still more participants. Finally, the initial
mailing to invitees asked each for more suggestions, a process that generated
approximately 50 more names. In sum, every effort was made to identify all
who might be interested in attending the conference (Nash 1994b). As was
pointed out to and later recognized by the conference organizers, the virgin
materials industry was notable in its absence and the dismantling,
reclamation, and recycling industries were underrepresented (Nash 1994a).
The conference agenda included a number of speakers followed by
facilitated breakout sessions. The entire group reconvened at the end of the
second day to present the points of agreement and disagreement. From these
summaries, conference organizers drafted a summary report outlining the
areas of agreement and disagreement among conference participants (see
Appendix 1). The report was sent in draft form to each participant along with
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a detailed Participant Evaluation form. Organizers also sent copies of the
draft report to an array of non-participants, including EPA personnel and
members of Congress.
3.4.2 Discussion
Unlike the steel conference, which focused on possible responses to
existing regulations and economic realities, the durables conference aimed to
blaze a trail for the creation of policies-that are just now beginning to take
shape or be discussed. The relatively infancy of the durable goods issues
meant that this conference differed from the incineration and nuclear energy
dialogues in that the stakeholding interests have not become polarized.
Therefore, the opportunity to achieve the stated goals of the conference
appeared to exist.
Forty-seven Participant Evaluation forms were returned to CTPID. In
every case, respondents at a minimum expressed their satisfaction with the
conference's value and in most cases, the answer to the question "Was the
conference valuable?" was affirmative. Many specified that the value was
primarily contained in the opportunity to exchange ideas with and learn
more about the perspectives of the other stakeholders. There was somewhat
less agreement in response to the survey's question regarding the
conference's contribution to policy making. Those who felt a contribution
was made saw the conference as the beginning of a policy making process
rather than as direct policy input. One participant noted, however, that
stakeholders are "just beginning to define the problem," making it difficult to
reach firm agreements on possible policy options. Those who responded in
the negative to the conference's policy making contribution had a variety of
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reasons, including the need to engage in a more focused discussion, especially
given the time constraints of a two day conference and the desire to reach
agreements. There was at least one complaint that all of the stakeholders had
not been represented. A truly inclusive dialogue, this person felt, would
have included other industries, radical environmental advocacy groups,
consumer groups, unions, and trade associations (Nash 1993).
At least one conference organizer has stated that the objectives of their
effort were too ambitious. While succeeding in their goal to promote a better
mutual understanding of the varying stakeholder perspectives, it proved to
be much more difficult to draft a statement of principles and to design a
process for a continued policy dialogue. This difficulty seems to have
stemmed in part from the perhaps erroneous belief that this single objective
would not be enough to consider the effort a success (Nash 1994b). Since, as
many participants noted, this conference is only the beginning of a dialogue,
it is difficult to pinpoint reasons why two of the three objectives were not
met. No doubt it was due in part to the relative infancy of the debate and the
need to reach a common level of understanding regarding the questions to be
asked.
Until very recently there had been no MIT follow-up to the March 1993
conference. At this writing, the conference organizers are in the early stages
of planning for a second gathering to discuss environmental issues
surrounding durable products. The decision to plan a second gathering was
due in part to the ideas and questions raised during the writing of this thesis.
Other factors included participants' desire to see a continued role for MIT in
the dialogue, the continued experience of European nations in this area, and
recent steps taken by U.S. industry to address recycling issues. The initial
thinking is that the second conference should focus on learning from others'
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experiences and sharing information and strategies rather than on outlining
directions for U.S. policy, as the first conference attempted to do.
Through our examination of past MIT efforts to engage stakeholders in
constructive dialogues, we have observed that for all the careful planning
that goes into a conference there is still a hurdle to overcome when sustained
dialogue is the goal. This is especially true when the dialogue is based on an
evolving set of issues. By looking at the dialogue now taking shape around
the issue of chlorine use, we hope to provide a better understanding of this
hurdle and to begin to propose a way to get past it.
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CHAPTER 4 - MANAGING THE FUTURE USE OF CHLORINE
4.0 Introduction
An ongoing MIT project to study the management of the
environmental impact of chlorine use provides an opportunity to expand the
research university role in the effort to promote effective policy making
when multiple stakeholding interests are involved and a great deal of
uncertainty is present. This problem area centers on the question of whether
chlorinated chemicals have undesirable environmental and health effects,
and if so, what should be taken into account in establishing policies regarding
their restriction or removal from the market. The following questions and
issues, formulated as part of an MIT position paper for a New Initiative in
Environmental Management, illustrate the topics a group like this might be
expected to cover. Without systematic analysis, there is no way of knowing if
the introduction of chlorine controls will have any overall beneficial effect.
Can chlorine, as some groups demand, be totally phased out? If not, are there
"good" chlorine uses and "bad" chlorine uses? What is the meaning of
"good" and "bad" in the context of economic and social development versus
health and environmental sustainability? How can industry make a
transition from existing to new technologies? The effects of possible
substitutes are poorly understood and may lead to other types of impacts on
the economy and on the environment. There is a basic lack of knowledge
about human health effects of chlorinated compounds on the environment.
Can this knowledge arrive in a timely fashion based on highly targeted
research efforts, or will there be pressure to decide before all the answers are
known?
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In this chapter, we will describe the efforts of MIT researchers in the
last three years to try to answer, or find ways to answer, these kinds of
questions. As will be evident, the chlorine study has been constantly
evolving as the issues, the stakeholders and their positions, and the
complexity of the problem have all come into greater focus. Having achieved
this improved focus, we are able to outline the role envisioned for MIT in the
evolving chlorine dialogue.
4.1 MIT/Norwegian Chlorine Policy Study, Phase 1
With funding from a group of Norwegian industry, non-
governmental, and government organizations, MIT researchers in the
Technology, Business, and the Environment program undertook an initial
assessment of the issues associated with the growing international dialogue
concerning chlorine use. A two-year effort by a group of faculty, staff, and
graduate students led to the publication of the Phase 1 report, "Dimensions of
Managing Chlorine in the Environment." The primary question that MIT
researchers sought to answer in this initial study was the following:
If chlorine chemicals have undesirable environmental and health
effects, what are the salient considerations that should be taken into
account in determining a course of action regarding their removal or
restriction in the market? (TBE 1993)
The second important question of this study concerned the effects that a
chlorine ban or restriction might have. As posited by the authors of the
study,
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If the answers to the acceptability questions are in the affirmative, that
is, that too much of some chlorine-containing chemicals are produced
and consumed, what is the best way to proceed in order to avoid or
mitigate the socially disruptive impacts of the action on the economy
of the country, a group of countries, or the whole world, depending on
the body that is undertaking such an action? (TBE 1993)
The Phase 1 report provides a context for the study of the chlorine
issue. The report comprises five case studies, intended to illustrate the kinds
of data needed to conduct a thorough policy analysis; an examination of the
"industrial ecology" of chlorine and the methods available to use industrial
ecology as a framework for policy analysis; and a summary of the study's
findings and policy implications.
In reporting their findings, the MIT group focused on the extreme
complexity of the worldwide chlorine "system" and the implications this has
for any attempt to ban or otherwise control the use of chlorine. The diversity
of uses, environmental impacts, and economic values associated with this
chemical makes the definition of a single, broad-based regulatory policy
difficult, if not impossible. For each instance in which a control on chlorine
is sought, regulators must provide answers to questions concerning the
scientific justification for their actions, the availability of alternatives to
chlorine use (in terms of both products and processes), and the
environmental and economic ramifications of a switch to a chlorine-free
product or process. However, it is not enough to base a decision on an answer
to only one of these question; simultaneous answers, each depending upon
and influencing the others, are required. The report concludes that the
existing policy making apparatus is insufficient for this degree of complexity
and that we therefore must devise new methodologies designed specifically to
accommodate multidimensional analysis (TBE 1993).
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4.2 MIT/Norwegian Chlorine Policy Study, Phase 2 Prospectus
A few months after the publication of the Phase 1 report, MIT
researchers prepared a prospectus for a second phase of the chlorine policy
study, in which continuing research on chlorine-related questions would be
"carried out within a policy-oriented dialogue framework" (Ehrenfeld and
Marks 1993). By linking ongoing research efforts with a continuous process of
communication between the major stakeholders in the chlorine debate, the
dialogue necessary for effective chlorine policy making would be not only
self-maintaining but self-improving. In the words of the Phase 2 prospectus
authors, "The coupling of research and policy-making is critical to the success
of this proposed project" (Ehrenfeld and Marks 1993).
The prospectus identified a wide range of potential research topics that
fit within four broad categories:
* Analytic or procedural frameworks for the development of policy
options;
* Environmental, technological, economic, and social analyses of
classes or families of chlorine use;
* Analyses of potential policy approaches; and
* Clean technology research and development (Ehrenfeld and Marks
1993).
The authors noted that the research should be conducted collaboratively with
other universities, as well as with government agencies, industry, and non-
governmental organizations. More importantly, the research topics outlined
in the prospectus were only those apparent from the Phase 1 research. As the
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understanding of the issues matured, the ongoing dialogue process would
assure and make necessary a fluid research agenda.
The concurrent dialogue process would be designed in recognition of
the fact that research to establish "facts" by itself would be an insufficient
means toward a policy making end. An open forum in which stakeholders
could air their differences and share important information would be
expected to help overcome the obstacles that are not amenable to arguments
on scientific or technical grounds. For example, a technological change
resulting from a restrictive chlorine policy would be expected to have a
positive effect on the environment, but maybe only at the expense of a
negative economic effect (e.g., a net job loss) on the industry faced with that
change. Only through a direct give-and-take could stakeholders try to reach
some level of agreement concerning the many trade-offs like this that would
become apparent. The Phase 2 prospectus described a series of regional
meetings for the purposes of maintaining a dialogue and providing the
forum for the exchange of information and ideas, and, optimally, the building
of trust and consensus.
MIT's specific role in this process would be as both overall coordinator
and research participant. As coordinator, MIT would manage funds provided
by other participants and foster the dialogue process. The MIT researchers
hoped to enlist the support and participation of major stakeholding groups
beyond the Norwegian concerns who had funded the first phase of the project
and who were continuing to fund the development of the larger effort (as
Phase 1.5). The initial focus was to be on governments, industrial
organizations, and environmental NGOs, as well as other research
institutions. A particular emphasis was placed on non-U.S. research
institutions.
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4.3 MIT/Norwegian Chlorine Policy Study, Phase 1.5 Activities
In the months following the completion of the Phase 1 report,
including the time during which the Phase 2 prospectus took shape, MIT
researchers learned a great deal about the difficulties associated with any
attempt to address a complex and far-reaching environmental issue,
especially when that attempt hopes to include all stakeholders. The following
is a summary of activities that took place between May and October 1993, the
result of which was a reassessment of MIT's goals. The original
documentation of these activities came in the form of an October
memorandum from the principal MIT researchers to a member of the
Norwegian Steering Committee (Marks and Ehrenfeld 1993).
In May 1993, MIT researchers presented the findings of the Phase 1
report to a meeting of the International Group of Chlorine Chemistry
Associations (IGCCA). In addition to the report findings, they presented some
early thoughts regarding the next phase of work. However, they left the
meeting with the impression that a more specific proposal had been expected.
In late June, one of the MIT researchers met in Oslo, Norway with the
Steering Committee to discuss the evolving Phase 2 Prospectus. The
Committee voiced some concerns, including a perceived bias against chlorine
in the Prospectus introduction and a need to focus any continuing work on
the provision of options to policy makers rather than on the creation of policy
itself. Additional comments provided through correspondence after the June
meeting emphasized that the project should "facilitate a continuous and
constructive dialogue," and suggested an approach based on sectoral, regional,
medium or other problem-specific concerns. The concept of a strategy
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encompassing all conceivable chlorine issues was seen to be somewhat
impractical. MIT researchers took note of these comments as they continued
to revise the Prospectus.
MIT researchers again met with the Steering Committee in Norway
during the August 1993 Environment North Seas conference. The
Committee seemed supportive of the general organizational principles
embodied in the revised Prospectus. Still, participants articulated a number
of concerns, including: the ability of MIT to lead such a large project on its
own; the need to recognize differences between European and US policy
making; the apparent lack of detail concerning NGO participation; and the
need to clearly define the conditions for stakeholder participation.
Significantly, one commentor noted that "constructive dialogue would be
valuable even if consensus were not reached."
In late September, MIT researchers traveled to Brussels where they met
with the Director of Eurochlor, who was receptive to the effort taking shape.
He too, however, discouraged an approach that sought to address all of the
chlorine issues within a single framework, and also voiced his opinion that
the consensus-building dialogue approach is more in the European style of
problem solving, perhaps expressing some doubt that this can be successfully
undertaken under U.S. leadership.
A subsequent meeting with the Chairman of the Paris and Oslo
Commissions (the bodies formed by European convention to oversee
environmental management in the North Sea) uncovered potential
difficulties for the MIT project. While interest among European stakeholders
to participate seemed to exist, the desired emphasis was on specific chlorine
issues and there was little if any consensus on which issue(s) to address first.
Furthermore, it was learned, a Dutch study of chlorine involving
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government and industry representatives had recently lost the support of
previously participating NGOs.
Upon their return to the U.S., the MIT researchers met with the
chairman of the Chlorine Coordinating Council, a U.S. group sponsored by
the Chemical Manufacturers Association to promote industry's positions in
the chlorine dialogue. He expressed an interest in working with MIT, but also
not in the way described in MIT's proposals. Instead, he saw industry
contributing the "data crunching" while MIT focused on the policy analysis.
In order for industry to participate, the process would need to be fair,
inclusive of all stakeholders, based on scientific integrity, and cognizant of
potential socio-economic consequences of any decision. Finally, industry
reminded MIT that the university must not be perceived to be against
chlorine or to assume that chlorine regulation is inevitable.
The result of this series of conversations with stakeholders was the
realization that, as then formulated, the plan for continuing the chlorine
policy study was too ambitious. Each interest group contacted had their own
agenda and priorities, a situation that would preclude any collaborative effort
based on a common vision of an overall strategy. Therefore, the MIT
researchers presented two new options to the Norwegian Steering Committee
for the continuation of the chlorine work.
The first option was the formation of a government-academia
initiative to study very specific chlorine issues. The focus would shift to a
process that excludes industry and NGOs from oversight positions because of
the current lack of incentive for these groups to voluntarily commit to a
consensus-building effort. The perception was that industry and
environmental groups were, at this point in the debate, unlikely to see an
advantage in contributing to a reduction in what was becoming a high degree
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of polarization. MIT would offer "neutral and objective" facilitation to help
governments focus on the risks and benefits of a particular chlorine use. The
goal would be to provide governments with enough information to begin
taking action, in effect forcing the polarized interests to choose between
coming to the table or taking their chances with policies that might result
without their input.
The government-academia initiative would begin with a two-day,
issue-specific conference at MIT to which all stakeholders would be invited.
Extensive advance work would clearly lay out the positions of each interest
and the areas in which further work is needed. Participants would be asked to
contribute to the dialogue through presentations, submission of data, and
active involvement in conference discussions. In addition, MIT would
initiate the creation of a database comprising the existing research data as well
as descriptions of ongoing research efforts in the area of concern. This
database would help to promote the continuation of a dialogue beyond the
conference. MIT researchers would select a topic for this initial conference
through consultation with industry and the Norwegian Steering Committee.
However, industry input would be sought from chlorine end-users rather
than solely from the chlorine producers, who had been the only industry
stakeholders involved to this point.
The second option presented by MIT was an acknowledgment of the
gulf growing between the various interests and to abandon the notion of a
collaborative approach involving all of the stakeholders. NGOs are gaining
momentum, especially through the mass media, in their advocacy of the
"precautionary" approach, and governments are responding by taking initial
actions to at least look at the possibilities of bans or other restriction.
Industry, meanwhile, remains steadfast in its insistence on hard scientific
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data to support any restrictive measure. If it were agreed that reconciliation
between these two perspectives could not be achieved, then a more realistic
approach for MIT and others might be to participate in the dialogue as
individual institutions rather than as parts of a collaboration (Marks and
Ehrenfeld 1993).
4.4 MIT Initiative in Environmental Leadership
Supported by a three-year grant from the V. Kann Rasmussen
Foundation, MIT researchers moved forward and organized an Initiative in
Environmental Leadership to continue the study of chlorine issues. This
Initiative combines ongoing research in important technical and non-
technical areas as well as a seminar series that seeks to tie together the
research efforts, thereby fostering the interdisciplinary understanding needed
to engage in the broader, international dialogue. The next step for the
Initiative is to organize an on-campus workshop, at which MIT researchers
will ask for the stakeholders' perspectives on the university's evolving role.
4.4.1 Research
Eight student/faculty teams are currently conducting chlorine-related
research as part of "An Environmental Strategy for Future Chlorine Use"
(PEEER 1994). The selection of research projects was based on the need to
address as many of the relevant disciplines as possible. The research falls into
four broad categories. The first concerns the movement of chlorinated
compounds in the environment. One team is investigating groundwater
contaminated with chlorinated solvents, with an eye toward quantifying
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discharge and degradation and then using this information to seek better
management practices for similar contamination problems. Two
atmospheric chemistry teams are focusing on the contribution to urban air
pollution of selected organochlorine compounds other than
chlorofluorocarbons and hydrocarbons. While the latter have serious
implications regarding ozone depletion and smog formation, an
understanding is also needed of the movement in the atmosphere of
compounds that are known or suspected human carcinogens.
The second issue area concerns the availability and implications of
potential substitutes for chlorine chemistry. A research team is investigating
the chemical synthesis of non-chlorinated pesticides. Two other teams are
developing a system that will allow manufacturers of materials such as
plastics to make more environmentally benign process synthesis decisions.
The economic and political aspects of the chlorine debate are the third
area of concern. A research team is looking at the potential effects of bans or
other restrictions on the use of chlorine in the context of differing
international economies. A key question in this research is whether
international regulations will diverge or if they will converge toward either a
"least common denominator" or toward a higher, more restrictive standard.
The final issue area concerns the way in which policies develop given
the multiple interests involved and the uncertainties associated with the
risks of continued chlorine use. A research team is compiling information
on the current state of scientific understanding concerning risk and specific
environmental impacts associated with chlorine. This work can serve as a
foundation for better, more informed policy making processes.
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4.4.2 Seminar
A complement to the ongoing research is a seminar series entitled,
"Management of the Future Use of Chlorine." In addition to presentations
from the above research teams, speakers from the MIT community and
beyond are invited to lend their perspective on some aspect of the chlorine
debate. The seminar is organized around the idea that some middle ground
must be found between the calls for a complete ban and those demanding
scientific proof that such a ban would provide a net benefit to society. Six
themes help to focus the seminar discussions. In the form of questions, they
are:
* What criteria should be used to identify the most problematic
chlorine-based chemicals and their uses?
* How can we identify the chemical "bad actors" on the basis of
environmental and health impacts?
* Where are the "low-hanging fruits," the currently most viable
major innovations modifying chlorine use?
· How should the social benefits of chlorine be measured?
* What political issues will shape or impede progress in reducing
chlorine use?
* How can action in this area be stimulated? (PEEER 1994)
The seminar met on four occasions during the 1993 Fall semester. The
first meeting served as an introduction and gave organizers a chance to
outline the objectives of the seminar. Subsequent meetings included
presentations by a visiting scholar from Norway who was instrumental in the
creation of the original chlorine policy study, by professors of chemistry and
chemical engineering who are examining the availability of chlorine
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substitutes, and by the principal researcher studying groundwater
contaminated with chlorinated solvents. Summaries of three of the four Fall
seminars are included in Appendix 2.
During January 1994, speakers representing two sides of the chlorine
debate came to MIT. On two consecutive days the seminar heard from a
leading proponent of the "precautionary principle" who has spent
considerable time studying the potential health effects of chlorine in the
environment, and from the chairman of the Chlorine Coordinating Council,
the leading U.S. industry voice in the chlorine dialogue. A summary of these
presentations is included in Appendix 2.
The seminar was scheduled to meet on five occasions during the
Spring semester. The first meeting focused on toxicological characteristics of
organochlorine compounds and the difficulty associated with defining classes
of compounds for the purpose of regulation (as an alternative to an across-
the-board ban on organochlorines). The second Spring seminar addressed the
application of risk assessment and risk management to the chlorine issue.
Summaries of the first two meetings are included in Appendix 2. Subsequent
meetings, held after the submission of this thesis, were to include a
presentation by a guest participant from Drexel University on drinking water
chlorination and the implications of calls for a chlorine ban, a presentation of
results from the MIT research team exploring the effects of a chlorine ban in
the context of differing international economies, and a report from
representatives of a major pulp and paper concern on the potential impact of
recently proposed effluent guidelines that would curtail the use of chlorine in
bleaching processes.
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4.4.3 Workshop
We are now beginning to plan for a workshop to be held on the MIT
campus in November 1994. Working under the title "Shaping the Chlorine
Agenda: A Roundtable for Sharing Knowledge and Perspectives," we seek to
redefine, if necessary, the role a university like MIT plays in solving complex
sociotechnological problems (Marks 1993). At the same time, the workshop is
intended to help provide a better focus for the traditional research and
education activities of the university. Although the emphasis will be on a
particular environmental management issue, the articulation of a forward-
looking university strategy for assisting in this type of process would serve as
a model for similar efforts in a broader range of issue areas. A more specific
description of our goals and the planning process for the workshop can be
found in Section 5.4.
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CHAPTER 5 - THE UNIVERSITY'S ROLE IN CREATING AN ADAPTIVE
DIALOGUE
5.0 The Challenge of Environmental Problem Solving
KEY POINTS
* Pursue focused, integrated, and interdisciplinary research
programs.
* Overcome tendency to engage in adversarial policy making.
* Initiate and sustain communication between stakeholders.
Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to finding a solution to any problem
that involves science or technology is uncertainty. The difficulty encountered
in establishing a universally accepted "fact" stands in sharp contrast to the
ease with which doubts can be raised about that fact. Often, a public policy
decision with widespread implications hangs in the balance. As a result, the
public that expects
solutions sees only debate, litigation, and an apparent lack of progress.
Many current environmental problems are characterized by a great deal
of complexity as well as a high degree of uncertainty. The global climate
change issue is a good illustration of this dilemma. What began as a
presentation of data predicting a potentially catastrophic rise in mean global
temperatures is now a debate over varying interpretations of a growing set of
data. Scientists are far from consensus on future climate trends or on the
societal impact of a rise in temperature. If policy makers were to try to address
in a comprehensive manner all of the non-natural factors influencing a
possible change in global climate, they would be faced with a daunting array
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of issues ranging from transportation to energy production to waste
management. None of these issues can be considered in isolation if a true
understanding of climate change is desired, yet the policy making process is
not well-equipped to integrate the many disciplines needed to fully
understand a problem of this magnitude. In fact, it is unreasonable to think
that scientists or policy makers could unravel the complex web of interactions
among the various issues in a manner that would allow the formulation of a
comprehensive mitigating strategy. And yet, an understanding and
appreciation of the fact that these interactions exist is vital to the success of
future environmental management strategies.
Environmental problem solving efforts tend to utilize one or both of
two basic approaches: consensus-building exercises that take into account
numerous perspectives and multiple stakeholders and the use of "neutral"
panels who are charged with sorting through existing data to uncover the
"truths" that will make policy decisions both rational and easy. In theory,
these approaches would eliminate adversarial relationships and lead to
effective policy; in some cases, an argument could be made that the theory
holds true (see Section 1.2.1 for a discussion of the NIH Consensus
Development Program). The fundamental problem with either approach,
however, is the implicit assumption that even in the context of the most
complex environmental problems we can find answers that are satisfactory to
all concerned. Having found the answer(s), the maintenance of relationships
between the participating interests would no longer be necessary. We propose
the explicit recognition of the inherent uncertainty and complexity of
environmental problems as a starting point for future efforts. As Jasanoff
writes:
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... agencies and experts alike should renounce the naive vision of
neutral advisory bodies 'speaking truth to power,' for in regulatory
science, more even than in research science, there can be no perfect,
objectively verifiable truth. The most one can hope for is a serviceable
truth: a state of knowledge that satisfies tests of scientific acceptability
and supports reasoned decision making, but also assures those exposed
to risk that their interests have not been sacrificed on the altar of an
impossible scientific certainty (Jasanoff 1990).
In this chapter we return to previous efforts by the MIT community to use the
university's resources as a means toward finding a "serviceable truth." We
then develop the concept of the "adaptive dialogue," a new tool that learns
from past experience and uses as its foundation the primary objective of the
university, education, in order to continuously adapt to the changing needs of
a problem solving effort. The goal of the adaptive dialogue is to foster
effective policy decisions in the face of highly complex and uncertain
problems without seeking to find "impossible scientific certainty."
5.1 An Approach to Environmental Problem Solving: MIT Stakeholder
Conferences
KEY POINTS
* Identification of important stakeholding groups.
* Identification of issue areas.
* Creation of a conference format based on a goal of consensus-
building or finding common ground among the participating
stakeholders.
* Statement of intent to pursue solutions through conference
follow-up work.
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Since the adaptive dialogue will represent a natural progression from,
rather than a replacement for, previous university experience with
stakeholder conferences, it will be useful to review the main components of
the efforts described in Chapter 3. [Although MIT gatherings have been billed
as both "workshops" and "conferences," we will for convenience use the
latter term only for the remainder of this thesis.] Having decided upon a
theme for a conference, the first task for university organizers is the
identification of stakeholders who might agree to participate. As we have
noted, any effort to approach a problem in a more collaborative, integrative
manner would ideally include as many stakeholders as possible. The free
exchange of information between stakeholders would be expected to
minimize or eliminate the adversarial relationships that can inhibit
successful policy making.
The identification process is relatively straightforward, regardless of the
issue. The main requirement is a prior familiarity with the issue and an
initial group of representative contacts. Since MIT researchers organize
conferences around topics related to their own research, it is not difficult to
begin building an invitation list. The desire for completeness leads
organizers to solicit the opinions of those who are to be invited in order to
generate a more complete list and to try to ensure that they do not exclude
important players.
The second component of conference organization is the development
of a substantive focus. The selection of a conference theme is a necessary but
not a sufficient part of the effort to develop this focus. In order to attract
stakeholders to a conference and to stimulate discussion among those who do
participate, it is necessary to select specific topics around which to structure
the proceedings. Typically, potential topics are discussed with and solicited
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from the stakeholders whom the university organizers contact during the
planning process. Each conference is unique in this respect, though in every
case the organizers seek to find the issues that are of most pressing concern to
the stakeholders as well as those that afford the stakeholders the opportunity
to anticipate future concerns. The organizers of the steel conference worked
closely with an industry trade association to frame the issues, while the
organizers of the incineration conference undertook an extensive pre-
conference study as a means of determining an appropriate conference focus.
The first nuclear energy conference drew on the research of leading
stakeholder representatives to design a conference that would cover the wide
range of issues associated with future use of nuclear power; the selection of
discussion topics was easier prior to the second conference because of the
evolution of the issues in the intervening years.
The third component is the design of the format in which the selected
issues are to be discussed and the articulation of the purpose behind the
announced format. In general, organizers structure the conferences with an
emphasis on direct communication between the stakeholders for the purpose
of reaching consensus or finding common ground. Organizers employ
various means to pursue their objectives, though in three of the four cases we
looked at the university's role was as a neutral or objective party.
The steel conference comprised four technical sessions at which
speakers provided background to prompt the open discussion that followed.
In this case MIT was advertised as the facilitator for these discussions and as a
potential resource for the steel industry to use as it worked to answer
technical questions. The incineration conference organizers were explicit in
their definition of the university as the "neutral" party facilitating a dialogue
among opposing interests. Recalling two of the stated objectives of the
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conference, organizers hoped that the stakeholders would leave with an
understanding of the sources of disagreement and with new relationships
that could foster the common search for solutions. The mechanism for
achieving these objectives was a series of formally facilitated dialogues. To
make this process work, organizers asked the stakeholders to agree in advance
to a set of groundrules.
The nuclear energy conferences were similar to the steel conference in
that they were based on a series of technical presentations followed by
discussion. In addition, a respondant spoke prior to the discussion. The
stated goals of these conferences were to foster "a common understanding"
among stakeholders. However, the university organizers clearly stated in
advance of the gathering that they represented another stakeholding interest
and were not acting as a neutral party. We will return to this important
distinction later. One of the objectives of the durable goods conference was a
written statement of principles to guide future policy making. The format for
this conference included both plenary sessions with invited speakers and
breakout sessions for facilitated small-group discussions.
The final major component, common to all four of the efforts we
looked at, is the expression of the university's desire to maintain a dialogue
after the conference has ended. What is significant about statements by the
university about this objective is that they are made in very general terms.
The planning process did not include any direct measures to promote a
continuation of the dialogues started (or continued, as the case may be) at the
conference. Perhaps this is reflected in the fact that the follow-up to these
efforts has been somewhat less than hoped, at least at this point in time.
The continuing "dialogue" proposed at the steel conference by MIT
organizers would take the form of renewed university-industry partnerships
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to conduct environmentally-oriented basic research. In its invitation to the
incineration conference participants, MIT organizers stated that they intended
to continue lending their support to an ongoing dialogue after the conference
was over. The nuclear energy conferences were intended to "assist the
process of communication" among the stakeholders. One of the three
objectives of the durable goods conference was to formulate a process that
would promote a continued post-conference dialogue among participating
stakeholders.
By identifying stakeholders and issues, designing conference formats
that would facilitate an open give-and-take among the participants, and
proposing that the university work to maintain the lines of communication
created at these conferences, MIT organizers took the initial, and very
important, steps toward the kind of problem solving that today's
environmental problems demand. And yet it would appear that something
more should be done if the university is to assume an important and lasting
role in the problem solving process. Some might argue that the university's
role should not extend beyond the academic exercise of convening
stakeholders in an environment hospitable to the free exchange of ideas. We
would disagree, and would instead propose that the university need only step
back, evaluate what it can and can not do well, and assertively move toward
the new problem solving paradigm that the adaptive dialogue represents. As
a first step in this direction, we turn now to the lessons we have learned
through our examination of the four MIT-organized conferences.
5.2 Lessons from MIT Experiences
KEY POINTS
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* Numerous factors make the maintenance of a dialogue more
difficult than is originally anticipated.
* Objectivity or neutrality is not necessarily the most appropriate
function for the university.
* A goal of consensus or reaching agreements of any kind is
generally too ambitious for any single conference.
* Planning for a stakeholder conference must focus as much on
the conference follow-up (i.e. the continuing dialogue) as on
the conference itself.
Perhaps the most important lesson we can take from previous MIT
experiences with multistakeholder dialogue processes is that for all the good
intentions of the university organizers, it is extremely difficult to maintain a
dialogue after a conference has ended. Following the incineration conference
organizers circulated two documents to the participants, first an "Agenda for
Action" and then a survey asking for opinions on the appropriate steps to be
taken in light of the dialogue achieved at the conference. Despite a response
acknowledging the benefits of a continued dialogue, there has been no
additional follow-up to date. The organizers of the first nuclear energy
conference were able to organize a second conference three years after the
first, but there are no immediate plans for a third and presumably any
dialogue among the participants continues only on an informal, ad hoc basis.
Until very recently, there were no plans to continue the durable goods
dialogue; organizers are now in the very early stages of planning a second
conference (tentatively scheduled for Fall 1994). This is not to say that the
kind of dialogue envisioned will not or can not be achieved; it merely points
to the fact that more attention should be paid to what can or should occur in
the intervals between physical gatherings on a university campus.
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If a university-sponsored conference is to foster an ongoing dialogue,
we feel that a university's articulation of the conference focus should
comprise not only a
definition of the important substantive issues, but also of the expectations the
university has for its role and for the way the other participants view this
role. Integral to this articulation is an emphasis on the long-term nature of
the process and on the idea that stakeholders will not solve problems in a
two- or three-day gathering but will only be laying a foundation for future
problem solving.
Nash (1988) proposed the role of university as mediator, suggesting
that given the current nature of issues faced by society this role is the
appropriate synthesis of the ivory tower, service station, and activist
university models. In the cases of the steel and incineration conferences at
MIT, the perception of the university was very much along these lines. The
organizers of the incineration conference even made it clear in their
invitation to stakeholders that they intended to be the "neutral" party.
However, one or more of the stakeholding groups may perceive an initial
university bias, making claims of neutrality or objectivity suspect. Within
the university there may be a hesitancy to assume an objective stance,
especially if the university fits the description of an activist institution. We
feel that the university does not need to sell its services as a neutral, a
mediator, or a facilitator, unless the problem solving effort originates outside
the university and the stakeholders specifically request this kind of
service. The nuclear energy conferences were particularly successful because
MIT organizers clearly defined the role of the university as convener and as a
stakeholder itself and not as an objective facilitator. When the impetus for
the problem solving effort comes from the university, the appropriate role is
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educator (see our discussion in Chapter 2). The research university is
committed to the education of its students, but today, especially given the
growing emphasis on applied rather than basic research, it would seem
reasonable to expand the definition of who the university's students are.
Industry officials, government regulators, environmental activists, and any
other person or group with an interest in the subject of a problem solving
effort would in effect become students of the university should they choose to
participate in the process. Furthermore, whenever research funding might
result from the dialogue initiated at a conference (which would be one
expected outcome), the university becomes a stakeholder and should identify
itself as such. By identifying itself in this manner, the university participants
would be indicating that they expect to join the other stakeholders in a
continuous learning process.
Concentrating solely on their roles as educators, university organizers
seeking to engage stakeholders in a dialogue would no longer feel the need to
define an alternative role based on neutrality or facilitation. Instead, they
could focus on a new organizing principle: fairness. The ability of the
university to provide an open forum in which stakeholders can state their
positions and associated rationales directly to other interested parties is at the
heart of the university's role as educator. Participants in the nuclear energy
conferences made particular reference to the fairness of the process created by
MIT and cited the value of this characteristic in the promotion of reasoned
and lasting solutions. Similarly, participants in the incineration and durable
goods conferences noted the value of the opportunity to exchange ideas with
and learn about the perspectives of the other stakeholders, in some cases for
the first time. Fairness, characterized by the open and free exchange of ideas,
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is a key element of the adaptive dialogue's foundation, for it will help to
build the trust that will be needed to keep the dialogue going.
Because the university will emphasize its role as educator rather than
as neutral, and because the university will define a conference as the
beginning of a long-term process, we can also dispense with the objective of
reaching a "consensus" during the initial gathering. Consensus is a common
theme at gatherings that involve multiple interests, which is natural given
that the purpose of bringing interests together is to find common ground and
develop solutions to mutually shared problems. The incineration conference
provides an example of an explicit attempt to reach consensus; in the
aftermath of the conference, participants said that consensus was a "naive"
goal and that in any case they did not expect to reach any consensus. And yet
conference organizers were very serious about providing a consensus-
building forum. The durable goods conference also had as an objective
finding areas of agreement among stakeholders, but by the end of the
conference it was clear that the issues were so far-ranging that the best the
participants could have hoped for was to more accurately define the
appropriate questions. We feel that a clear statement from the university that
consensus does not need to be an explicit goal of a conference is an important
step in setting the tone for what is likely to be a long-term process. Consensus
is desired whenever possible, but given the complexity of environmental
issues it will only arise as the result of more work than can be accomplished
in a short conference, if at all. Consensus may never be achieved when the
set of related issues is especially complex, but this should not preclude
effective policy making.
We can derive one final lesson from the other lessons described thus
far. Conference planning must proceed simultaneously on two tracks: the
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first would provide the framework for a successful physical gathering, while
the second would ensure that planning for the gathering would lay a
foundation for the post-conference dialogue. Table 5.2 summarized the In the
next section, we describe the important elements of the planning process and
the proposed mechanism for maintaining an adaptive dialogue.
5.3 Form and Function of an Adaptive Dialogue
KEY POINTS
* A CONTINUOUS, ADAPTIVE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE
VIEWED AS AN EDUCATIONAL, NOT A CONFRON-
TATIONAL, PROCESS.
* The identification of stakeholders does not end when a
conference begins.
* Similarly, the identification of issues can be expected
to change over time.
* GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS IN PARTICULAR
WILL BENEFIT FROM THE GROWING BODY OF
KNOWLEDGE AND SHARED UNDERSTANDING
GENERATED BY AN ADAPTIVE DIALOGUE.
As we described in the previous section, an adaptive dialogue should
be viewed as a continuous educational process. Focusing on an educational
basis for a problem solving effort establishes a university like MIT as the
appropriate institution to organize a dialogue.
We recognize the importance of using a conference format to initiate a
dialogue process. In the conference setting, stakeholders have the
opportunity to establish relationships in a way that only personal interaction
can provide. Presenting an argument before a live audience is far more
powerful than any other means of communication. However, preparations
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for a university conference and the conference itself are only the prelude to
the real task of problem solving. The adaptive dialogue's success depends
upon the ability of the stakeholders to tailor their discussion and their
research to the changing needs of a problem area and to maintain a high level
of communication after a conference is over. Ultimately, the way in which a
particular adaptive dialogue operates will depend on the objectives, the
resources, and even the initial degree of polarization that the stakeholders
bring to the dialogue. Our proposal for the adaptive dialogue is guided in part
by the concept of the "virtual organization," a corporate management tool
that offers a set of principles that seem especially relevant in light of the
complexity of environmental problems (see box on following page).
In order to create an adaptive dialogue, we must take a second look at
stakeholder and issue identification. When a proposed dialogue topic is very
broad and still in a developmental stage (that is, consensus does not exist on
the appropriate questions for a dialogue), it is more difficult to identify and
include all of the stakeholding interests. While organizers in three of the
MIT cases reported relatively little difficulty identifying the relevant interests,
either because of a relatively limited focus (steel) or a preexisting set of
dialogue participants (incineration and nuclear energy), organizers of the
durable goods conference found that participants noted the omission or
under-representation of what were considered to be key interest groups. This
occurred despite organizers explicit attempt to limit the dialogue to two
sectors of what is clearly a very large universe of potential stakeholders. It
would generally be the case that the identification of some stakeholders could
occur only after the dialogue had begun and the issues came into better focus.
However, in creating an adaptive dialogue, ensuring complete coverage
of the stakeholding groups does not need to be of the highest
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Guiding Principles: The "Virtual Organization"'
The concept characterized by the use of the term "virtual" has established a
firm foothold in the late-twentieth century industrialized world and is growing
rapidly. What began as "virtual memory" in the early years of the computer
industry has been appropriated by the corporate world and renamed "virtual
organization." Today we see the beginning of a new industry that promises a
"virtual reality" in which we will enjoy entertainment, shopping, and other
previously mobile experiences from the comfort of our favorite chair. In each
case, however, the underlying premise remains the same; to generate utility
through the use of tools or techniques that do not rely strictly on physical
associations.
Virtual memory in a computer enhances the computer's functioning ability
by making it act as if it has more memory than it really does. In doing so, the
computer "perpetually adapts to the needs of the user" (Malone and Davidow
1992). In industry, a virtually organized corporation is also based on the principle
of maximizing adaptability. In order to take advantage of a business opportunity
that requires capabilities beyond those which it possesses, a company would form
temporary alliances with other companies that can provide those capabilities.
Each company would enter the alliance to extract some benefit from a market to
which it would not otherwise have access. As summarized in a Business Week
cover story, the virtual corporation includes the following attributes: Excellence -
each contributor to the organization is a specialist in one particular area, making
the joint effort one of unsurpassed quality; Opportunism - the organization can
act quickly to take advantage of a situation and just as quickly dissolve when it is
no longer beneficial to remain in alliance; Technology - a key component of the
virtual organization, electronic networks will facilitate the cooperative efforts of
entities who are physically separated; and Trust - with each participant dependent
upon the others, new levels of openness will be required (Byrne 1993).
Virtual corporations may or may not become commonplace in the future;
there are already skeptics who dismiss the concept. Andrew Grove, Chairman of
the Intel Corporation calls the virtual corporation a "business buzz phrase that's
meaningless. It's appetizing but you get nothing out of it" (Byrne 1993). Indeed,
with the commercialization of virtual reality applications, the term "virtual" is
likely to become even more of a buzzword, largely devoid of its original meaning.
However, the principles underlying a "virtual" approach to a problem or
opportunity are of enduring quality, especially in the context of environmental
management. The uncertainty and complexity associated with environmental
issues would seem to require an approach based on the ability to utilize the best
human resources, to react quickly to changes in the understanding of a problem, to
use technology to maintain open lines of communication, and to continuously
build the level of trust among stakeholders.
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priority. While the organizers' goal should be to attract representatives of as
many groups as possible (given the size and resource constraints of a
proposed conference), those who are not part of this initial gathering would
have the opportunity to participate as the dialogue emerges from the
conference and continues to develop. To this end, the initial list of potential
participants should be made as large as possible even though it should be
acknowledged in advance that this list will probably be incomplete.
Just as the identification of stakeholders should remain fluid, so too
should the identification of appropriate issues to include in the dialogue. In
previous MIT conferences we have observed considerable attention paid to
the formulation of issues for discussion. We believe that this will continue
to be a necessity especially as topics encompassing an ever broader range of
potential issues become the focus of conferences. If specific questions or
issues are not part of the initial conference, the effort will likely become
bogged down in disagreements over the direction in which the dialogue
should proceed. In an adaptive dialogue, the choice of initial topics is of
lessened importance because of the recognition that as the issues evolve the
dialogue will incorporate those with the most bearing on future policy needs.
Therefore, conference organizers need only choose issues that will serve to
stimulate a discussion. Extensive advance research (e.g., for the incineration
conference) combined with consultation with participating and non-
participating stakeholders (common to all four of the conferences we
described) should allow organizers to accomplish this task.
Participants will leave the initial stakeholder conference not with
agreements or answers, but with the momentum and the incentive to
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continue talking. The organizing university would assume the initial
responsibility for forming a communication network to facilitate the
continuing dialogue. The primary means of communication would be
electronic with provisions for those who do not have networking capabilities.
The dialogue will focus initially on a limited subset of topics (to maintain
focus and manageability), preferably a subset agreed upon by the stakeholders
at the conference. Clearly this initial topic selection might mean that some of
the original participants may have less of a need to be actively involved in
the early post-conference discussion, but they would be asked to remain
actively in the process as the dialogue would be expected to slowly expand
back into their particular area of concern. All stakeholders would be
encouraged to contribute whatever knowledge or perspective they might
have regardless of the specific focus of the dialogue.
The substance of the dialogue would be limited only by the
stakeholders themselves. An important component would be the reporting
of research results as well as descriptions of ongoing and planned research
efforts. If necessary, MIT would serve as a clearinghouse for information,
compiling summaries or otherwise facilitating the transmission of
information in a timely, concise manner. The university organizers would
be responsible for the mechanics of the network and for publishing periodic
summaries of the dialogue proceedings to distribute to the participants; for
those not tied in to the network, these reports would serve as the primary
link to the dialogue. The dialogue's success will depend heavily on the
provision to all identified stakeholders of complete information; anything
related to the dialogue issues that one participant brings to the dialogue
would be made available to all participants.
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A key to the dialogue would be the ability to add new participants and
to adapt the substantive focus as the dialogue matures and evolves. Rather
than simply curtailing the discussion of a topic or set of topics, the intention
would be to expand the dialogue and tie new topics into those already in the
network. This would serve to promote and reinforce the integrative needs of
the overall dialogue. Participants may elect to leave the dialogue, citing
anything from philosophical differences to a feeling of satisfaction that they
have attained a desired outcome. The departure of a stakeholder would not
represent a breakdown in the process, since they would remain a part of the
network and could re-engage at any time.
Stakeholders at other universities would be significant contributors not
only to the initial conference but to the dialogue, especially in terms of
communicating information on research. At some point, it may be desirable
to transfer the more administrative duties from the dialogue-initiating
university to another participating university, or to set up a rotating schedule
for the preparation of the periodic reports. The involvement of other
universities would also be important in terms of identifying and initiating
new research efforts; research should be collaborative whenever possible to
reflect the nature of the dialogue.
It would be desirable to reconvene the current roster of participating
stakeholders on a regular or semi-regular basis. As we have described, the
opportunity to interact directly with other stakeholders is of great value and
would help to re-focus and reinvigorate the dialogue. We envision yearly
meetings as a start, but the schedule would depend again on the dialogue's
needs as defined by the participants. A yearly meeting might best serve as a
way to address in a more comprehensive manner a particular point that has
caused some difficulty in the dialogue; this would create the advantage of
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convening a very focused conference, where advance work would be built in
to the ongoing process.
The way in which the adaptive dialogue becomes a policy making tool
is straightforward. Any of the full-time or part-time dialogue participants as
well as interested non-participants, faced with the need to make a decision
related to the issues in the dialogue, could tap into the collected body of
knowledge as if it were a database. If the topic of interest had been part of the
dialogue, the decision-maker would have access to the most current scientific
and technical information and would quickly be able to get a handle on the
current perspectives of the stakeholders, the continuing points of
disagreement, and the reasons why disagreement still exists. With this
information in hand, the chances for effective policy are improved. In
theory, opposition would be lessened because those who disagree with the
policy decision would at least have been a part of or had access to the process
from which the decision arose. If the dialogue is carefully managed and well-
publicized and the major policy players are involved (as we hope they would
be), then there should be a smooth interface between the dialogue and the
policy making process. Policy making would be guided by the dialogue just as
the dialogue would be guided by the needs of the policy makers.
5.4 Chlorine Revisited
As we have described, we will have an opportunity in November 1994
to create an adaptive dialogue for the purpose of addressing the management
of the future use of chlorine. The workshop will be limited to approximately
100 representatives from government, industry, environmental groups, and
the academic community. Our efforts to develop an invitation list for the
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workshop began with the compilation of approximately 30 names
representing each of the four main stakeholding groups: government,
industry, non-governmental organizations, and academia. The next step will
be to use our resources and those of the initially identified group to generate a
mailing list of at least 500 people. The initial letters of invitation will include
a description of MIT's vision for an adaptive process that stresses the
university's role as a provider of a fair process in an educational framework.
It is crucial that the concept of adaptability be central to the planning
process, including the development of the participant list and the creation of
a suitable agenda. We believe that while it is important to attract
representatives from the widest possible range of disciplines and perspectives,
it will be more important to impress upon the participants that they are only
the core of what will be an ever-expanding network of stakeholders. Even if
the workshop were not limited in its size, it would be impossible to identify
and attract representatives of "all" stakeholding groups because the chlorine
debate has not matured sufficiently to know with confidence who all the
stakeholders are. A major goal of the workshop should be to enlist the
participants in the effort to identify more stakeholders. This and the creation
of a database of stakeholders during the invitation process will facilitate the
addition of new voices to the dialogue as it evolves.
Structuring an agenda is a more difficult task. The number of issues
that could be discussed is very large and constantly growing. Our goal is to
prevent the workshop from turning into a forum in which arguments
already widely known throughout the stakeholder communities are repeated.
On the other hand, since we hope that the workshop will be the first occasion
for some of the stakeholders to interact directly, it will be useful to ensure that
the group share a common understanding of what those arguments are. To
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this end, it would be useful to generate a background document, similar to
that prepared for the 1988 incineration conference, that highlights the key
attributes of all known stakeholder positions. If such a foundation document
can be prepared, with the cooperation of the participants, in advance of the
workshop we will be able to build on this foundation when the stakeholders
convene.
We have developed a tentative agenda that asks participants to look at
the chlorine issue in a broad context. Industry, government, environmental
advocate, and academic views would be heard regarding the following
questions:
* What are the important problems associated with managing chlorine
use?
* What are the important research needs?
* What are the important policy needs?
* What can the university do to promote cooperative multistakeholder
problem solving?
These questions could promote dialogue on a variety of topics: What research
is ongoing? What is the rationale for that research? Are chlorine substitutes
on the horizon? What interventionist mechanisms can governments
employ? What are the barriers as well as the incentives for innovation faced
by industry? Can risks be prioritized? It is difficult to predict the directions in
which workshop discussions might go, nor is it necessary to try to push
participants toward one topic or another. During the planning stages, we will
listen to participants' opinions on appropriate topics and try to structure the
agenda around areas of common interest. However, we feel that at this stage
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of the dialogue the specific substance of a two-day workshop is of secondary
importance. If we are to articulate any objective for this workshop, it should
be to define and begin planning the mechanism that will allow the workshop
discussion to continue as part of an adaptive dialogue. We have learned
from the experiences of others that it is not enough to articulate a goal of
continued dialogue if concrete steps to promote that dialogue are included
during the planning and execution of a stakeholder gathering. As a means of
establishing an initial framework for the dialogue, substantive issues will be
an important part of the workshop. But without considerable attention paid
to the question of what will happen when the workshop ends we are unlikely
to see the evolution of the university role that we believe is both useful and
necessary.
Throughout the coming months, it will be interesting to observe the
reaction of the stakeholders to our proposal. We are hopeful that they will
recognize the opportunities of the adaptive dialogue and will engage in the
process with enthusiasm and resolve.
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CHAPTER 6 - CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The adaptive dialogue is not a complicated idea and it is not far
removed from mainstream thinking about the need for more cooperation
and integration in the search for solutions to environmental problems.
Where it does differ from current thinking is in the way the adaptive
dialogue recognizes and incorporates the nature of the problems it is
designed to address.
We recognize that many issues would require resolution if the
adaptive dialogue is to function as envisioned. An obvious question
concerns sources of funding for a sustained problem solving effort. While
the university responsible for coordination will require financial support, the
amount should be kept to a minimum and should remain separate from
funding provided for related research efforts. Funding mechanisms must be
carefully constructed so as not to create the perception that the process is
biased in favor of one or more interests over the others.
The university must also be prepared to address concerns that it will
not be able to maintain the role we are proposing for it. Stakeholders might
be concerned that the university researchers will lose interest in an issue like
chlorine in favor of another issue that is gaining in prominence. They may
also be concerned that the constant turnover in graduate students, who will
provide assistance to the dialogue effort, will be an ongoing drain on the
institutional memory needed to sustain a long-term effort. Our response to
concerns like these is that the work will not be concentrated at one university,
it will only begin at one university. Furthermore, the continuous expansion
of a dialogue to encompass and integrate a variety of disciplines should
ensure that there will always be interest in the academic community. Just as
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other stakeholders can come and go depending on the needs of the dialogue,
so too can academic representation and administrative responsibilities shift
from one university or research group to another.
An equally important concern for organizers of multistakeholder
gatherings is getting the desired participants to accept the university's
invitation to a conference. In some cases, as we observed with the steel and
nuclear energy conferences, the reputation of MIT has real drawing power.
This would particularly be the case when the issue has a significant
technological component, as is the case with most current environmental
issues. However, reputation alone will not ensure a successful conference.
The university must take into consideration the incentives each stakeholding
group has to attend or not to attend a gathering of this kind. For example, a
fundamental difference between the effort to address the future use of
chlorine and the effort to address a specific topic like coke oven emissions at
steel plants (one of the primary issues at the steel conference) is that the
former is concerned with products while the latter is concerned with process.
It should not be surprising that there would be some reluctance on the part of
the chlorine industry to participate in a dialogue that has as one of its central
themes the potential banning of chlorine products. On the other hand, the
steel industry is very willing to participate in a dialogue that seeks to find
solutions to the legislatively mandated coke oven emission regulations. The
steel makers do not need to argue for their very survival, they only need to
participate in the search for better ways to manufacture a product that all
agree is a necessary component of the world economy.
The chlorine-producing industry has already expressed a willingness to
participate in a process that does not begin with the presumption that
chlorine will be banned or otherwise regulated. Their incentive to participate
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increases with their belief that the process will be open to all policy options.
Environmental organizations may be less inclined to participate because of
their feeling that the trend in regulation favors their agenda and that to
exchange ideas with industry might be seen as a willingness to accept
compromise at a time when they should press their advantage. However, as
the incineration and nuclear energy conferences indicate, environmental
groups do not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity to have an equal
voice with industry in a problem solving setting. Government
representatives are generally open to the idea of meeting with stakeholders
and, as we have indicated, the trend seems to be toward a preference for this
kind of approach. The challenge is to convince government agencies that a
conference leading to a dialogue would be more than an academic exercise
and in fact could be a valuable policy making tool. We feel the best approach
for the university to take in providing each group with the incentive to
participate is to be very clear about the goals of the conference and its
aftermath and to be equally clear about the function the university will play
in achieving those goals.
A significant general concern among participants might be that it is
unrealistic to believe that governments will not only participate actively in
an adaptive dialogue but will also rely on them to assist in the policy making
process. We agree that it would not be appropriate or very realistic to propose
a change in the actual policy making process that occurs in a federal
government. The layers of bureaucracy that exist can not simply be replaced
by a process that makes the government only one of many interested parties.
We do not propose that the power held by the federal government to make
policy should be in any way diminished. However, we do propose that the
government would be well served to support and participate fully in this
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process as a stakeholder. What a government needs to make more effective
policy is access to the best information available and the broadest support
possible from the interests with a stake in the final policy formulation.
When the policy making necessarily requires some consideration of technical
matters, the adaptive dialogue provides a way for the government to have
access to the most current information and, more importantly, to the many
perspectives of the interests involved. Armed with this knowledge,
government is more likely to be able to avoid the problems that beset it
during adversarial policy making. There would be no guarantee that
everyone would come out of such a process feeling as if they had achieved the
optimal outcome, but if the process works there will be less divergence
among interests and less likelihood that final policy decisions leave one or
more positions feeling left out, resentful, and poised to continue challenging
government's efforts to move forward.
We close with a few words about what is ultimately the greatest
challenge to this or any environmental problem solving effort. Our
increasing understanding of the most complex environmental problems
leads us inevitably to the conclusion that the best solutions will be
international in scope. We have implicitly described "government"
participation in the adaptive dialogue as the involvement of officials from
the United States, but this stems only from our familiarity with the policy
making arena in the U.S. and the likelihood that the focus of our efforts will
be on issues affecting U.S. policy. We should always strive to include
participants from other countries in these dialogues, so that as the dialogue
grows it may become more useful on an international scale. We are
encouraged by the successes of previous MIT efforts to bring international
perspectives to their conferences; the nuclear energy dialogue stands out as an
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example not only of this but of the positive effect that this added perspective
can have on a dialogue. We are also encouraged by the Norwegian
community's support of MIT's efforts to promote the chlorine dialogue.
Creating a process that allows an adaptive dialogue to cross international
political boundaries in support of global policy making may never be fully
realized. We leave this task as an opportunity for continued research.
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Agenda for Action:
Suggestions From All Parties Involved in Waste Management
This report is the result of a June, 1988 meeting held at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology entitled Waste Incineration: Confronting the Sources
of Disagreement. About 25 people from industry, government,
environmental groups, citizens groups, and academia attended the meeting;
its purpose was to clarify the sources of disagreements over incineration as a
waste management technology, and search for areas of potential agreement.
A participant list is included as an attachment to this report.
After the meeting, we drafted an Agenda for Action which recounted the
ideas generated at the meeting. We sent this Agenda to the participants, and
requested editorial comments, reactions and additional suggestions. This
report derives from the returned surveys. Rather than reiterating each
suggestion, we have reorganized and consolidated the most prevalent ideas.
They fall into five categories which correspond to major stages or aspects of
the waste management process (waste management planning, facility siting,
facility operations and monitoring, regulation and permitting, and public
education).
In response to a number of comments, we refocused this paper from the
narrow concept of incineration as a technology for waste management, to
waste management as a whole. (In this document, "waste management" is
construed to include waste or source minimization, as well as the reuse,
recycling, treatment and disposal of whatever remains.) This change
addresses the concern that incineration cannot be considered apart from other
waste management options, and that part of the problem with many
incineration proposals is that they do, in fact, attempt to separate incineration
from the broader concept of waste management. Because the conference did
focus on waste incineration, this paper does not attempt to address in a
complete way the larger issue of waste management; rather, we have changed
the discussion of incineration to reflect its relation to these larger issues. For
example, many of the most useful suggestions were directed specifically
100
toward incineration issues. We have incorporated these suggestions, but
broadened their applicability whenever possible to all waste treatment
technologies.
A related concept which pervaded the conference discussions and written
suggestions was the need for waste management planning. Particular facility
siting or permit proposals are difficult to accommodate (from the
citizen/environmental perspectives) without some objective determination
of the need for that facility, considering the current and projected future waste
streams, front-end minimization, and alternative treatment options. For this
reason, a particular facility siting or permitting effort will be facilitated by a
prior planning effort. Therefore the bulk of the suggestions which follow
address ways to improve waste management planning. However, as facilities
will undoubtedly continue to be proposed in the absence of prior planning
efforts, suggestions which are useful in these situations are also included.
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principles To Guide Waste Management Efforts
The following two principles pervade all of the suggestions which follow.
Parties should use these principles to guide their waste management
proposals and actions.
A) Waste management, including front-end minimization, is a social
responsibility which must be shared by industry, government, public
interest groups, and the citizens themselves. Any effort to change the
status quo must explicitly recognize this shared responsibility. "Shared" in
this context means that all parties must be willing to take steps towards
improved waste management practices. 2
B) Any waste management strategy should reflect the following hierarchy of
preferred options: a) reduce the amount of waste generated, b) reuse and
recycle, c) treat, and d) use land disposal for any treatment residuals and
remaining waste.
Suggestions To Improve Waste Management Planning
The following suggestions apply to any parties involved in waste
management planning. As item A) makes clear, the preferred planning
scenario is one in which all interested parties take part. However, these
suggestions should be helpful to any waste management planning effort.
A) Developing plans and other documents which identify current and future
waste management options will assist the management process. In
addition, documents such as environmental impact and health risk
assessments will assist any subsequent facility siting and permitting efforts.
The following principles should guide the creation of these documents:
1) The document preparation process should reflect the shared
responsibility for waste management. Each stakeholder group should
have a direct role in determining the plan's content. "Direct" in this
context means a primary role, as opposed to a commenting-on-the-
draft role.
2) Each party to the planning process must acknowledge that the
document may prescribe changes to the status quo in order to create
options for future action; changes in current practices, norms, and
comfort levels may be required of all parties.
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3) Each party to the planning process must acknowledge the importance
and legitimacy of both technical and non-technical concerns in waste
management.
B) The following actions, prior to or as part of any specific planning effort,
would improve the document's reception by all parties.
1) Develop a joint understanding of the limits of recycling and the limits
of treatment technologies.
2) Develop broadly acceptable risk assessment protocols.
3) Develop credible data bases.
C) The following elements could improve the analytical frameworks for
comparing waste management options. Parties devising waste
management plans should consider their use.
1) Models which the general public can understand.
2) Multi-media analyses, which account for impacts to all compartments
of the environment and all routes of human exposure.
3) Cost effectiveness analyses, including an assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of not producing a particular waste.
4) An accounting of social costs and benefits of the alternatives, including
the "no action" alternative.
5) An analysis of short-term benefits vs. long-term liabilities.
6) A discussion of the unquantifiable, intangible impacts a facility may
have on a resident's way of life. The analytical framework should not
discount such factors simply because they are not quantifiable.
7) Health risk analyses should not use cancer risk as the sole indicator of
risk.
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D) Waste management plans should examine a wide range of facility
development possibilities to meet the area's needs. For example, the plan
could examine:
1) Creating novel partnerships between the public and private sectors to
build and operate waste treatment and disposal facilities.
E) In designing a waste management planning process, the government
should consider the following techniques:
1) The use of specific representatives from all parties to provide
consistency in the planning efforts.
2) The use of public meetings and workshops to scope concerns outside
those raised by the parties preparing the plan; use forums other than
the traditional "hearing" mechanism.
3) The use of independent consultants.
4) The use of public and private funds to assist those parties who wish to
participate but do not have sufficient resources.
5) The use of a "generic" environmental impact statement or health risk
assessment to describe waste management alternatives and their
advantages and disadvantages.
6) The use of dispute resolution processes, such as facilitation and
mediation, to help the participants agree on plans for action.
Suggestions to Garner Support for Waste Management Planning and
Facility Siting Efforts
The following suggestions address ways to garner support for specific waste
management planning and facility siting proposals. Like the suggestions
above, they are useful for parties involved in waste management planning,
but they are also useful for parties involved in facility siting and permitting.
Although any siting effort would be aided by a previous or coincident
planning effort, often facilities are proposed without a planning document in
place. These suggestions should be helpful in either case.
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A) Support or efforts to manage and control waste production and disposal
mav be expected to increase if:
1) All parties exhibit a willingness to explore a wide range of
management options and/or facility sites.
2) All parties invest time and energy into understanding each other's
points of view.
3) All parties make conscientious, visible efforts to build each other's
trust and enhance their own credibility.
B) Support for waste management efforts may be expected to increase if the
shared responsibility for waste management is made an explicit element of
a plan's implementation or a facility's operation. Ideas toward
incorporating this shared responsibility include the following:
1) All parties should aggressively enforce any new ordinances, policies, or
facility permit conditions which arise from the plan. For citizens, this
may mean encouraging friends and neighbors to participate in
recycling efforts or household hazardous waste collections. For
industry, implementing a self-monitoring system. For government,
conducting inspections and pursuing penalties against violators.
2) The parties should continue their open exchanges of information
through such forums as regular meetings, innovative communication
networks (such as citizen concern hotlines), or third-party audit results
distributed regularly to local residents.
C) Support among industry and the government for the public's demands
concerning waste management proposals may be expected to increase if:
1) The public acknowledges that every individual is a waste generator,
and every individual has helped create the waste disposal problem.
2) The public demonstrates a willingness to change its everyday actions
and habits, (just as the public demands that industry redesign its
processes and priorities), in order to create a more manageable waste
stream.
3) Environmental and citizen leaders spearhead the efforts to
communicate these needs to the rest of the public; these messages do
not have the same credibility if communicated by industry or
government representatives.
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D) Support among the general public for waste treatment proposals may be
expected to increase if:
1) Industry implements reasonable source reduction programs first, and
then demonstrates that incineration is a necessary technology for
managing a certain portion of the unavoidable wastes.
2) Operators agree to consistently provide the community with unbiased
information regarding the facility's operations and impacts on the
community. "Unbiased" in this context means that the information is
provided in such a manner that the operator cannot alter or influence
the data; real-time monitoring data accessible at community libraries is
one example of unbiased information.
3) Industry and government establish enhanced information, education
and outreach programs to inform the public about waste management
efforts already underway.
Suggestions To Improve Waste Management Facility Operations
The following suggestions address changes to operational aspects of facility
operation. Although all parties would benefit from these changes, they lie
primarily within the authority of the facility owner/operators. By voluntarily
incorporating these suggestions into a facility proposal (as opposed to agreeing
to them at another party's insistence), operators could gain good will and
enhanced credibility benefits in addition to the benefits inherent in the
suggestions.
A) Training and certification of incinerator operators would benefit all
parties. It would ensure a consistent minimum standard of operator
performance, thus
1) Achieving the desired level of service and safety.
2) Enhancing the facility's credibility by assuring operator competence.
B) Monitoring programs which provide both the operators and other parties
(local residents, environmental groups, and citizens) ready access to
information about the facility are an important element of the shared
responsibility for waste management. The following sorts of programs
could benefit all parties:
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1) Continuous monitoring of compliance-related parameters such as
carbon monoxide, residence time, and temperature, transmitted to the
other parties via computer, daily reports, or other means. The data
should be in a form easily understandable by the intended audience.
2) Regular communication opportunities where the operators can keep
the other parties current on the plant's operating status, future plans,
problems and solutions, and where the other parties can ask questions
and express concerns and suggestions.
Suggestions To Improve Waste Management Facility
Permitting and Regulation
The following suggestions address regulatory changes which would ease the
permitting of waste management facilities. They are particularly relevant to
industry and government, but to other groups as well to the extent that they
can influence the regulatory processes. These suggestions could be addressed
immediately; they do not require a particular situation to be useful.
A) The following regulatory changes would improve the standard-setting
and/or siting process for particular facilities.
1) As knowledge evolves, so should standards. In facilitating this
evolution, however, parties must strike a balance between fixed (and
soon-to-be-obsolete) standards, and too frequent changes which result
in a moving target.
2) The process by which standards are promulgated and reviewed must be
made more efficient.
3) Total emissions into all media should be monitored, including ash as a
type of emission.
4) Environmental performance standards should be promulgated for
recycling centers as well as for treatment facilities.
5) Standards should incorporate occupational health and safety concerns.
6) Regulations should encourage and make recycling more attractive (but
not at the expense of lenient health-protection requirements).
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Suggestions to Improve Public Education in Waste Management
The following suggestion addresses public education, which certainly could
improve the waste management efforts. Implementing these suggestions is
not necessarily within the authority of the conference participants.
Nevertheless, to the extent any party can help bring them about, all parties
could benefit.
A) Broad public education efforts are necessary to inform people about the
importance of, and difficulties associated with, responsible waste
management. Possible forums for such efforts include:
1) Grade school education in pollution prevention, including educating
the teachers.
2) Educating community leaders through service club talks.
3) Widespread community awareness campaigns.
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Design and Disposal of Durable Products:
What's the Best Route?
Report from the Conference*
In March 1993 the Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology sponsored a conference entitled
"Design and Disposal of Durable Products: What's the Best Route?" The
purpose of the conference, as stated by conference organizers in advance of
the meeting, was three-fold:
* To assess, from the point of view of representatives of all the major
stakeholding groups, the strengths and weaknesses of the different
approaches to fostering "green" durable products. 1
* To produce a written statement of principles to guide those responsible for
developing future U.S. public and private policy in this area.
· To design a process for continued environmental policy dialogue on
durable goods among all concerned interest groups.
This report summarizes the findings from the conference. It was prepared by
conference organizers and represents their view of the major points of
agreement and disagreement raised at the meeting. To place these findings in
perspective, this report also discusses the roots of the durable products issue
in the U.S., as well as the format and organization of the conference.
Emergence of durable products as an environmental concern
Public concern over the environmental impacts of durable products is
awakening in the United States. This concern is rooted in two related
environmental issues. The first is the problem of diminishing sites for
municipal solid waste disposal. This problem emerged more than a decade
ago as local disposal sites reached capacity and closed in many communities.
* Nash, Jennifer. 1993. Design and Disposal of Durable Products: What's the Best Route?
Report from the Conference.
1 "Green" products are products whose manufacture, use, and disposal cause minimum damage to
the environment. Durable products are consumer products that are intended to remain in use for
at least three years.
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Public opposition made the siting of new facilities nearly impossible, and
disposal costs escalated.
Until recently, policy makers in the U.S. have focused upon modifying
product packaging as a first attempt at solving the solid waste disposal
problem. Local governments have initiated programs to recycle paper, metal,
glass, and plastic containers. While costly, these programs have increased
recycling rates for packaging in many communities. But packaging only
accounts for approximately one-third to one-half (by weight) of the municipal
solid waste stream. To achieve greater reductions, policy-makers have begun
to look beyond packaging to focus upon products, particularly large durable
products such as automobiles and electronics. Because of their size and the
potentially toxic materials they often contain, disposal of these products can
be especially difficult. Recycling is also problematic due to the complexity of
both the ways products are designed and the materials used to make them.
The second issue at the root of emerging public interest in durable
products is concern that current patterns of consumption of the earth's
natural resources are not sustainable. While concerns over sustainabilitv
have been evident before (for example, during the 1970s Arab oil embargoes),
the issue rose to prominence in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, where sustainable development was the central theme. The Earth
Summit prompted much discussion about the roles of government and
business in husbanding and conserving the earth's resources for succeeding
generations. As policy-makers have grappled with the idea of sustainability,
durable products have emerged as a possible target for legislative action.
Durable products require large quantities of natural resources in their
manufacture and use.
In the U.S., new policy making at the federal level with respect to
durable products is in a preliminary stage. Debate over reauthorization of the
1972 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1991-92 included
discussion of mandatory use of recycled materials in manufacture and
"environmental" labeling that would tell consumers whether a product
contains material that is recycled or recyclable. These initiatives are similar to
proposals made with respect to packaging. At the time of the conference,
neither of these proposals was under active discussion by lawmakers.
Policy making has progressed differently in Europe. An approach
known as "extended producer responsibility" is being adopted in several
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European countries, in various forms. "Extended producer responsibility"
means that producers take responsibility for the environmental concerns
generated through manufacture, use, and disposal of the products they make.
The reasoning behind this approach is that producers are in the unique
position of being able to redesign products and packages to make them more
environmentally sound throughout their life-cycles. In Germany,
government has issued a series of regulations requiring manufacturers to
establish and finance systems to "take back" and recycle consumer and
transport packaging. The German government has further proposed that
manufacturers of automobiles and electronic and electric appliances institute
"take back" programs for their products, and is currently negotiating with
industry over how the programs will be implemented. The Netherlands and
Sweden are also developing policies to extend producer responsibility.
The question conference planners urged the group to consider was not
whether something should be done to reduce the environmental impacts of
durable products but how to create an effective public policy framework to
address this problem. Conference organizers asked participants: What
policies should be used and who should be in charge? Should government
establish the duties for those involved in the manufacture, use, and disposal
of durable products? Should the task be left to those in business? How
should responsibility be allocated among all the actors, including the
consuming public?
Conference Participants and Organization
Conference planners decided to focus discussion upon two major
industries -- automobiles and electronics. Autos and electronics are the
targets of pending "take back" regulation in Germany. Planners invited
leaders from most of the major stakeholding groups involved in shaping
environmental policy for these products -- manufacturers and suppliers, state
and federal government, and environmental advocacy groups. The
conference was open to anyone representing an organization or business with
an interest in this area. Ninety-three people participated. Participation
included fourteen electronics companies, ten automobile companies, nine
agencies of the federal and state government, seven non-governmental
organizations, six suppliers, six universities, five consulting companies, four
professional societies, two recycling companies, and one member of the press.
111
Notably absent from the conference were firms representing the virgin
materials industry. Also, the dismantling, reclamation, and recycling
industries were underrepresented.
At an opening session conference planners asked participants to agree
to a rule: no one would attribute any of the comments made at the conference
to an individual without his or her expressed consent. With no debate,
everyone agreed, and discussion began. One of the objectives of conference
planners was to initiate a dialogue among stakeholding groups before these
groups developed inflexible positions regarding specific legislative proposals.
Perhaps because of this timing, the tone of conference discussions was open
and positive. People seemed to be listening to one another, and there were
few sharp or angry responses.
Conference planners organized the conference into two major parts.
The first part explored public policy approaches governments are using to
encourage environmentally sensitive product design and disposal. The
second part included discussions of private sector initiatives, in place now or
planned for the future, to spur development of "green" products. Each part
began with presentations from speakers. Speakers included representatives
from the European and U.S. auto and electronics industries, an
environmental advocacy group, and the staff member of the Senate
committee responsible for environmental legislation. Following the
presentations participants broke into three working groups of approximately
30 people each. Working groups were led by facilitators who helped the
group develop its agenda, stay within time limits, and identify areas of
agreement and disagreement. (A copy of the conference agenda is attached to
this report.)
At the final conference session all participants came together to hear
reports from the working groups. While each group's discussion was
different, many themes were common to all three groups. While there was
probably no area in which conference participants were in unanimous
agreement, on many matters concerning the general direction of public and
private policy most participants agreed. The remainder of this report
attempts to capture the sense of conference discussions.
Findings from the conference
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Points one through seven below represent the areas in which participants
were largely in agreement. The explanatory paragraphs that follow each point
draw out some of the places where participants saw things differently and
disagreed. Together, these findings provide general guidance for policy-
makers working to address the environmental concerns of durable products.
1. Conserving natural resources should be a primary objective of public
policy concerning the manufacture, use, and disposal of durable products.
Facilitators began the first working group by asking participants to address the
question "What are helpful public policy initiatives to foster recycling of
durable products?" People in all three of the working groups were dissatisfied
with this question and spent time initially to rephrase it. Nearly everyone
felt that "recycling" was too narrow an objective.
After debate, all three working groups came to the conclusion that
conserving natural resources should be the objective of public policy in the
area of durable goods. Natural resources include clean air, water, and land, as
well as energy and virgin materials. Conserving resources encompasses
activities such as reducing use of hazardous substances, increasing the
efficient use of raw materials, and conserving energy in manufacturing.
Not everyone who attended felt that public policy should be developed
to address the environmental issues surrounding durable products. Many, in
fact, felt that policy-making at this time would be premature. But most
participants agreed -- given the premise that policy is forthcoming -- that the
appropriate focus should be upon conserving resources. Support for this
objective was strong and widespread.
2. Lack of understanding and information impedes action.
Conference participants cited lack of understanding as a major impediment to
effective action -- on the part of governments, companies, and consumers.
Representatives of the different groups, however, focused upon different
areas where they felt understanding needed to improve. Many from industry
focused upon the need to improve understanding of the environmental
problems (if any) that durable products pose. They said that public policy
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should not be developed without clearer articulation of these problems.
Industry representatives also stressed the need for better knowledge of life-
cycle assessment (LCA) techniques. Representatives from environmental
advocacy groups said that industry should not use the need for understanding
as a "delay tactic" and that decisions must be made with "imperfect
information." They emphasized that environmental information that is
already available is generally poorly organized and not easily accessible.
Participants agreed that consumers need to develop better
understanding of the environmental impacts of their purchasing, use, and
disposal decisions. Many conference participants felt strongly that education
of consumers should be a top priority. But there was no consensus about who
should educate consumers, and about what concerns.
To address the problems of inadequate information and
understanding, many participants called upon the federal government to:
Support research to provide basic information on the environmental
impacts of durable products manufacture, distribution, use, and
disposal.
Research should:
* Document impacts of all stages of the product life cycle, especially
the early stages in which raw materials are extracted;
* Be developed through the joint efforts of representatives of all the
stakeholder groups;
* Be publicly accessible;
* Be integrated into other environmental databases.
Initiate at the federal level a process to achieve agreement and clarity
on definitions and standards.
Much discussion occurred in all three working groups about the need
for federal definitions of terms such as "virgin resource content," "recycled,"
and "recyclable." Nearly all participants, from a cross-section of stakeholding
groups, agreed that clear and standardized definitions would benefit
everyone. They concluded that the federal government should initiate a
process in which representatives from all groups could take part in
developing new definitions as well as standardizing the definitions used in
existing regulations.
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Most of the companies represented at the conference operate in many
countries. Their products are manufactured, sold, and disposed of in a global
marketplace. Conference participants urged policy-makers in the U.S. to work
to harmonize U.S. standards and definitions with environmental initiatives
world-wide.
3. Public policy should foster innovation and learning.
Conference participants called for the development of policies that would
allow responsible actors -- government, producers, and consumers -- to
experiment and learn about effective approaches to conserve natural
resources. They offered two recommendations:
Institute voluntary initiatives modeled on the EPA "Energy Star" and
"33/50" programs.
Conference participants said that the EPA programs "Energy Star" and "33/50"
were models of programs that foster innovation and learning. One
participant suggested that government initiate a program of voluntary
resource conservation goals for companies. This suggestion was supported by
others who noted that companies determined to become environmental
leaders would move quickly to meet the goals, and that their learning could
then be transferred to other firms. Several people said that such a program
would be particularly helpful for companies that are just initiating recycling
and conservation efforts. Participants explained that the objective of initial
public policy efforts should simply be to "get things going." An additional
benefit, according to representatives of environmental groups and some
others at the conference, would be to make firms accountable for their
environmental activities with respect to durable products. Several
representatives from companies cautioned, however, that EPA should
institute voluntary efforts selectively since firms cannot respond effectively to
a multitude of programs.
Make government a "model customer" through changes in
procurement policies.
Representatives from electronics firms spoke of what they called "antiquated"
government procurement requirements that mandate the use of new (rather
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than recycled) materials in government electronics purchases. Participants
asked government to become a "model customer" by requiring features such
as energy efficiency, recycled content, and design for disassembly in products it
buys. These requirements would give firms incentives to innovate. This
proposal received broad support.
4. Policy should remove distortion from the market to make recycled
materials competitive.
Representatives from industry and environmental advocacy groups spoke of
the need to allow markets to stimulate development of "green" durable
products. Several participants said that the key public policy question is,
"what can governments, industry, and suppliers do to enhance -- and not
interfere with -- market action that is already progressing?" Representatives
from environmental advocacy groups stressed the problems caused by the
existing subsidies for virgin material exploration and extraction. While not
agreeing on the magnitude of market distortions or the mechanisms that
should be used to remove them, participants agreed that an important
objective for public policy should be to "level the playing field" to internalize
environmental costs and allow recycled materials to compete with virgin
materials.
5. Policy should reflect the diversity of the durable products industry and the
different opportunities and constraints producers confront.
Many participants voiced support for the general principle that "every
manufacturer should recognize the impact of products beyond manufacturing
and sale and devise strategies to reduce that impact." However, no agreement
could be reached with respect to the types of strategies that would be
appropriate. Participants felt strongly that what is appropriate would depend
upon the product, industry, and market conditions. Representatives from the
automobile and electronics industries stressed the different opportunities and
constraints they face.
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Auto industry participants reported that extensive recycling is already
taking place now for cars in the U.S. and Europe. The automobile is among
the most highly recycled of all products, at 75 percent by weight," explained
one auto executive. Auto recycling is done by the "economically viable" and
"highly efficient" recycling industry. Companies that recycle cars operate
independently from auto companies; both the recycling and auto industries
want to maintain this independence. Several auto industry representatives
pointed out that labor costs in the recycling industry are lower than in the
auto industry, and that if the auto industry were to enter the recycling
business, "labor rates would escalate, making recycling more costly and less
economical."
Those from the auto industry also stated that cars manufactured today
contain some 600 pounds (25 percent by weight) of non-metallic material --
plastic, rubber, glass, fluids, and fabric -- which, given today's technology,
markets, and infrastructure, must generally be landfilled when cars reach the
end of their lives. They said the auto industry is working to address these
issues through the Vehicle Recycling Partnership of "Big 3" companies and
collaboration with plastic suppliers (via the American Plastics Council) and
dismantlers.
In contrast, recycling is a new activity for most firms in the electronics
industry. A few large companies are experimenting with "take back" and
recycling programs. But while an independent industry is well-established
for recycling autos, businesses to recycle obsolete electronics are in start-up
phases. Most used electronics are disposed directly in landfills, with no
recycling. The electronics industry faces decisions about the role it will play in
developing a recycling infrastructure for its products.
Conference participants stressed that the different needs of these
industries should be reflected in policy.
6. Companies should strengthen internal management.
In addition to identifying actions that governments should take, conference
participants said companies should also take steps to address the
environmental concerns associated with durable products. Many of these
steps are components of strong programs to address a broad array of
environmental concerns, not just durable goods:
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Commitment from the top of the company.
While participants agreed that top management support is necessary, they
noted that motivation can come from managers and "move up" to the CEO
or can be ordered "from the top down." Building support throughout the
company is essential. One tool to build support is a company statement of
policy with respect to environmental management. This statement should
recognize that in the context of profit and growth the company must produce
products and services that are environmentally sound.
Establish communication linkages.
Participants stressed the need for companies to develop new mechanisms for
internal and external communication about environmental activities. One
group focused upon the need for communication among design teams in
different product areas. Another emphasized the role of marketing
departments in tracing changing customer expectations, competitor
initiatives, and prospective legislation for feedback to the design teams.
Companies should build awareness among suppliers regarding changes to
their products and manufacturing processes.
Measure waste generation and natural resource consumption.
Companies need to develop programs to measure and assess their
environmental performance in terms of the amount of waste they generate
(both manufacturing and post-consumer waste) and resources they consume.
Several participants noted that accurate measuring is very complicated. Just
defining what is to be measured can require much thought and analysis.
Develop partnerships with outside suppliers, government, and
consumers.
Manufacturing firms should provide incentives to their suppliers to develop
new, less costly technologies that use recycled inputs. Partnerships with
government, such as the voluntary programs noted above, can help to
strengthen the credibility of firms' environmental activities. Many also felt
that companies have an important role to play informing consumers about
the environmental impacts of their products.
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7. Institute a process to continue discussions.
Conference participants spoke of the need to "continue" and "extend"
communication initiated at the conference. Communication should include
a cross section of industries, government, environmental advocacy groups,
and universities. Participants noted that few opportunities exist for such
communication geared toward development of policy recommendations.
Several people noted that discussions would benefit from increased
representation from dismantling and recycling industries and virgin
materials suppliers. Many spoke of the usefulness of having a university
serve as the "neutral convener" of such a dialogue.
Cross-industry conversation was particularly helpful to people from
the auto and electronics firms because it helped them recognize important
differences as well as some common links. Representatives from electronics
firms said they felt they could learn from the auto industry's greater
experience with metal recycling. One common link among all of the
manufacturing firms represented at the conference was an interest in plastics
recycling. These firms are confronting similar issues as they struggle to
recycle plastic and felt they could benefit from working in some form of
partnership.
Assessing the conference
Conference discussions revealed broad agreement regarding the basic norms
that should guide environmental policy with respect to durable products.
This policy, in the view of most participants, should be driven by the need to
conserve natural resources. Conference discussions also pointed to broad-
based support for several federal initiatives: development of informational
databases to quantify resources depleted in all phases of the life-cycle of
durable products, definition of terms such as "virgin materials content,"
"recycled," and "recyclable," and procurement policies that would favor
"green" products. In the view of most participants, these initiatives should be
developed through the joint efforts of representatives of all stakeholding
groups.
There was less agreement about the public policy instruments that
should be used to foster actions to conserve natural resources. Many voiced
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support for federally-initiated voluntary programs and market-based
incentives. Preference for these policy approaches may be a reflection of the
fact that most conference participants represented private firms. Had a greater
proportion come from environmental advocacy groups and government
offices, the approaches favored might have been different.
Following the conference, organizers asked those who attended what, if
anything, they had gained through participating. 2 In general, people valued
the opportunity the conference offered to share perspectives with people from
different stakeholding groups. Several people noted that few opportunities
exist for this type of sharing. Usually interaction is contentious, with little
chance for an open exchange of views. While saying that the conference had
been helpful in initiating a dialogue, many noted, however, that it was "too
early" for a rigorous discussion of the pros and cons of policy options. "We're
just beginning to define the problem," said one participant.
These views point to the value and the difficulty in convening
stakeholders to help set the direction for environmental policy. Participants'
willingness to come and speak openly, their ability to find some common
ground, and their interest in continuing a dialogue, are endorsements for
consensus-building meetings such as the MIT conference. One of the
objectives of conference organizers was to initiate this process of consensus-
building before stakeholding groups had developed inflexible positions
regarding specific policy options. But discussions of policy at this early stage
were by necessity general in nature. Going beyond the general findings
developed at the conference will require further discussions among all
stakeholders, including several key parties that did not participate.
2 Organizers distributed a first draft of this report and a conference evaluation form to all 93
participants. Forty-seven people sent back comments on the report and the completed
evaluation.
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APPENDIX 2
MANAGEMENT OF THE FUTURE USE OF CHLORINE
A SEMINAR SERIES SPONSORED BY THE
KANN-RASMUSSEN FOUNDATION
Meeting: 22 October 1993
TITLE: A First Look at the Key Issues
The first meeting of the chlorine seminar provided the participants
with an opportunity to hear from Dr. John Ehrenfeld, Senior Research
Engineer, CTPID, and Lecturer, Dept. of Chemical Engineering. Dr. Ehrenfeld
gave an overview of both the chlorine use. As an introduction to his
presentation, he provided a response to a question that one participant had
submitted in advance. The question concerned the number of chlorine
compounds of the 15,00 in commerce that have actually been studied in
enough detail to even attempt to quantify their environmental impacts.
While the answer is in fact very few, the important point brought to the
attention of the seminar was that the issue of chlorine and its uses is one
characterized by an enormous amount of uncertainty. A great deal of
research has been conducted, but little, if any, consensus has been reached.
The current controversy surrounding chlorine is a direct result of this lack of
consensus.
Dr. Ehrenfeld's presentation provided a summary of the ongoing
program at MIT, supported by the Norwegian governments, as well as
Norwegian industry and environmental groups, to study the implications of
regulating chlorine or even going so far as to completely ban chlorine
production. This overview included brief discussions of the key policy
questions, the major research tasks as defined by the MIT researchers, and a
history of previous ban and phase out efforts. In addition, Dr. Ehrenfeld
made the following points: phase outs and bans are inherently political
actions; there is available evidence of the feasibility of phase outs (both
politically and technically); and that there are a number of complicating
factors associated with a phase out, such as substitute chemicals or
technologies have their own environmental implications.
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As a means of converting this information to a policy analysis
framework, Dr. Ehrenfeld presented a three dimensional trade-off between
risk/cost and value-in-use of a particular material that contains or requires
the use of chlorine. This led to a discussion among the participants regarding
technological innovation and substitutability. Among the points to come out
of this discussion were:
- that we need to consider in advance whether substitute might (or
will) be available;
- that there is an important difference between examining these
trade-
offs in an academic setting and in the "real world", and that this
difference must be recognized;
- that bans and phase outs shift the focus from the market to the
design/innovation process; and
- that history has shown that regulation does bring on technological
change, and that the more stringent the regulation, the greater is
the substitution response.
Dr. Ehrenfeld's presentation continued with a discussion of process.
For large, complicated issues like chlorine use, the normal process in which
fact-finding leads to solutions is not enough. Issues such as politics and
economics must be taken into account. Furthermore, the players are actively
engaged in the process of finding answers, meaning that there simply is not
enough time to study the problem in an academic manner. A discussion of
the role of the academic community in the necessary dialogue followed. The
key characteristics of this role were identified as 1) providing a forum in
which the various parties can interact, 2) assisting in technology transfer
through education, and 3) identifying opportunities for substitution research
and development. Dr. Ehrenfeld concluded with the presentation of four
points comprising the overall strategy of the MIT effort:
- Intermingle research and an ongoing policy dialogue;
- Involve all parties;
- Combine broad general analysis with specific cases; and
- Build a critical mass of participants and support.
A final discussion concerned the question of where to draw the line
when the possibility of a complete chlorine ban is raised. Can we adequately
distinguish between chlorine compounds that are of concern and those that
are not? What are we to make of those who call for a ban on chlorine
without distinguishing between chlorinated compounds and elemental
chlorine? Theses are questions that seem to require answers if any kind of
successful chlorine policy is to be formulated.
Research Opportunities
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· Innovation and technology forcing.
· Institutional barriers to substitution.
* Quantification of chlorine's economic value.
· Toxicology of specific chlorinated compounds.
* ***** ***** ********** **
Meeting: 5 November 1993
TITLE: Risks of Chemicals in the Environment
Jorn Siljeholm, a Visiting Research Scientist, graduate student in the
Department of Chemistry at the University of Oslo and a former president of
the Norwegian Friends of the Environment, gave a presentation on the risks
of chemicals in the environment and whether those risks can be accurately
ranked in any way. Siljeholm outline a number of strategies and approaches
to dealing with chemicals in the environment, including: elimination
strategies (through new technologies or new products) versus reduction
strategies (end-of-pipe controls); the "good enemy" approach, defined as
working against interests that are unable to defend themselves; a focus on
primary production, in which appeals are made to governments and/or high-
ranking individuals (e.g. CEOs); and a focus on tertiary production, in which
appeals are made directly to the market and its consumers to force changes in
the production, use, and disposal of chemicals. Siljeholm noted that the
relevance and feasibility (technological, economic, political, institutional) of
any approach are the most important factors to be considered.
Siljeholm continued by laying out some of the arguments and reasoning
on which efforts to control or eliminate chlorine are based. A plot of octanol-
water partition coefficients as a function of solubility for a number of
chemicals led to a discussion of persistence and
bioaccumulation/biomagnification. One argument is that these are the
factors that are most important to consider if chemicals are to be ranked based
on their relative risks. Siljeholm presented risk-ranking equations that take
into account half-lives, partition coefficients, solubility, and vapor pressure,
but do not take into account degrees of toxicity. The point was made that it is
easier to design away from persistence problems than away from toxicity
problems. A discussion of this approach followed, in which questions were
asked regarding whether an emphasis on persistence and bioaccumulation is
"widely recognized" as being sensible for risk assessment, and, if toxicity is
considered, whether the focus should be on ecotoxicity or human toxicity.
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A common theme throughout this discussion and the previous seminar
concerns the lack of generally accepted science with which to tackle chlorine
questions. The chlorine industry states that they are willing to make the
necessary changes, but only after they have been shown the science that tells
them who the "bad actors" are. This questions can not be answered until
better agreement is reached not only on what science is important (e.g. toxicity
v. persistence), but also how the science should be conducted.
Research Opportunities
· Market-based strategies for chemical elimination or reduction
· Fate and transport of chemicals as a measure of relative risks
· Ecotoxicity of chemicals as a measure of relative risks
Meeting: December 10, 1993
TITLE: Industrial Solvents in The Environment: Case Study of the
Aberjona (Woburn, Mass) Watershed
Professor Harold Hemond from the Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering gave a presentation on the characteristics of, and
problems associated with, the release of chlorinated solvents into the
environment. Professor Hemond is conducting research in this area, using
the Aberjona Watershed (north of Boston) as a study area.
Industrial solvents (DCA, TCA, TCE, PCE) are produced and used in
enormous quantities throughout the world. Twenty or thirty years ago, a
substantial fraction of the solvents used were, for example, released directly to
the environment through disposal in lagoons and drywells. Of 32 wells that
have been sampled in the Aberjona Watershed, 27 have contained water
contaminated with TCE. All but two of the solvents detected in these wells
are chlorinated. Contamination in the area was initially discovered in Wells
G and H (municipal supply for E. Woburn, MA) in 1979 after barrels were
discovered in the Aberjona River at an upriver location. The correlation of
this discovery with the previously identified clustering of leukemia cases in
children whose water came from Wells G and H led to the designation of the
area as a federal Superfund site and to the research efforts now ongoing. A
study of heavy metals (arsenic, chromium) is among those being conducted
in addition to the studies of chlorinated solvents.
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Professor Hemond gave a general overview of the physical and
chemical properties that make chlorinated solvents the environmental
problem that they are. Due to their relatively high densities (> 1.0), these
chemicals are categorized as dense non-aqueous phase liquids (DNAPLs) and
sink through the saturated zone until they reach a relatively impermeable
layer (an aquitard, e.g., clay or bedrock). This process is enhanced by the
solvents relative insolubility; though their solubilities are just high enough
to result in part per million concentrations in the ground water. As
chlorinated solvents sink through the saturated zone, small, discontinuous
parcels may be left behind so that in addition to a pool of chemicals at the
aquitard, residual saturation may exist throughout the saturated zone.
Finally, if the aquitard is bedrock, fractures in the bedrock surface are likely to
result in the continued downward migration of the solvents. The problems
associated with chlorinated solvent release is obvious: they are hard to find in
the subsurface and have a low mobility once they get there. The latter fact
means that trying to pump the solvent out of the ground may have only
limited success.
Remediation efforts focus on both physical and chemical/biological
methods. It is important to note that natural flushing (i.e. an essentially "no-
action" response) is always available. The questions that need to be answered
are whether it is better from an economic and risk standpoint to simply leave
the contamination alone or whether remedial processes can be used to
enhance the natural processes. The first rule of remediation is to remove as
much of the pure solvent as possible. Because of the low solubility rates,
even small pools of solvent can decades to dissolve into the ground water,
resulting in what is, in effect, a continuous source of contamination. Drilling
wells to recover solvent is problematic because drilling a little too far might
mean creating a hole in the aquitard that acts as a drain for contaminants to
move to lower subsurface layers. A solution to the problem of residual and
dissolved contamination left after the pure liquid has been removed is to
increase the flow of water flow to accelerate dissolution ("pump and treat").
Again, however, the low solubility means this process is likely to take a very
long time. Also, the heterogeneity of the subsurface material (low
conductivity regimes) might cause contamination to "reappear" after
detectable concentrations reach zero and pumping has ceased.
A number of other remediation techniques are available. Hydraulic
containment is the process of strategically placing wells to "capture" all of the
ground water that might be contaminated. If the contaminated soil is near
the surface, it can be excavated and treated/disposed at an off-site location. In-
situ aerobic biodegradation is possible if organisms can be introduced that not
only break down the contaminant but also use it as a nutrient in order to
increase the organism population. Unfortunately, chlorinated solvents are
not amenable to aerobic degradation through oxidation. Instead, they can be
reduced through the process of reductive dehalogenation, in which chlorine
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is replaced with hydrogen resulting in a compound that microorganisms can
decompose.
Professor Hemond outlined the plan of research in the Aberjona
watershed. The two major tasks are to identify and delineate the solvent
contamination through systematic reconnaissance and prioritization, and to
complete quantitative assessments of chemical fate. The ground
water/surface water interface is an important area of research, since
quantifying discharge rates will help to measure the natural flushing
processes and since the combination of the reducing and oxidizing
environments found in sediments and water, respectively, may hold promise
for the degradation of chlorinated solvents. The question was raised whether
this work will help to determine if alternatives to the chlorinated solvents
are likely to be easier to deal with if they too are released to the environment.
Professor Hemond answered that this work will provide the necessary
framework within which to assess the physical and chemical characteristics of
alternatives.
Professor Hemond concluded with a brief discussion of the
instrumentation he is developing to measure volatile organic compounds in
the subsurface. For a ground water setting, he is working on a driveable probe
with a semi-permeable membrane that can be connected to a mass
spectrometer. This type of instrument would be both portable and universal
in its ability to detect subsurface contaminants. Obstacles that remain include
developing the membrane so that it will not be damaged upon exposure and
the physical chemistry problems associated with conveying a vapor through a
membrane, through a probe, and into the mass spectrometer.
Professor Hemond made note of the ongoing remediation efforts at
two of the Aberjona Watershed hazardous waste sites. After a year of
pumping and treating the ground water, at an expense of millions of dollars,
approximately 8 kilograms of solvent has been recovered. This inevitably
leads to the question of whether the benefits justify the current costs of this
type of remediation effort.
Research Opportunities
· Identification of and contaminant transport through bedrock fractures.
· Anaerobic biodegradation processes/effective microorganisms.
· Economic, risk-based tradeoffs associated with subsurface remediation.
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Two speakers were invited to MIT during the Independent Activities
Period to continue the discussion of the management of the future use of
chlorine. Dr. Theo Colborn and Brad Lienhart represent two of the many
parties that need and desire to be present at the table as this important
dialogue progresses. They each presented important perspectives, Dr. Colborn
from the research community and Mr. Lienhart from the chlorine industry in
particular and the chemical industry in general.
Meeting: 25 January 1994
TITLE: Developmental Effects of Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals
Dr. Colborn spoke on the developmental effects of endocrine-
disrupting chemicals in wildlife and humans (see Environmental Health
Perspectives 101, October 1993). She began by describing the work that she has
recently been involved with, such as the study of the Great Lakes (which led
to the publication of her book, Great Lakes, Great Legacy?) and the
Wingspread conference which brought together scientists from numerous
disciplines to discuss the effects of chemicals on sexual development. Aside
from the scientific knowledge that was gained during these efforts, Dr.
Colborn noted that she also gained a better appreciation for the great gulf that
exists between policy-makers and scientists and for the great need for these
two groups to work much more closely if truly effective decision-making is to
result.
Dr. Colborn described numerous studies that together are beginning to
paint an alarming picture of the effects that chemicals have on the
development of wildlife and humans. For example, it is now believed that a
single dose during gestation is all that may be needed to result in a negative
developmental effect, primarily by disrupting the normal mechanisms
controlled by endocrinal systems. Dr. Colborn presented a long list of
chemicals that are reported to have endocrine-disrupting effects, noting that
many of these chemicals are chlorinated compounds.
Of particular concern is the fact that in addition to their toxicity, these
chemicals are often persistent and bioaccumulative, and operate through a
number of mechanisms including blocking cell-to-cell communication,
disrupting enzyme activity, and behaving as endocrine disrupters. However,
they are often not mutagenic and display equivocal human carcinogenicity.
Therefore it may be concluded that traditional risk assessments to evaluate
these chemicals are misdirected; in fact, the reproductive effects of the
chemicals may be the area deserving of the most serious attention.
Dr. Colborn provided descriptions of the wildlife and human studies
that together form a body of work that points to the breadth and seriousness
of this issue. The fundamental problem in addressing the issue is the conflict
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between asking science to demonstrate incontrovertible cause and effect
relationships and the belief that if what the science seems to be showing is
true, then there simply is not enough time to let science complete these
demonstrations.
During a discussion period, the following questions and issues were
raised. Dr. Colborn's responses are provided.
· What is the reason for the Japanese scientific community initiating
developmental studies so much earlier than the rest of the world?
The primary reason is that the Japanese diet is dependent upon species
(such as whales) that are particularly affected by the relevant chemical
releases. Dr. Colborn also noted the difficulty encountered in recent years
to gain access to the important data gathered by Japanese scientists.
* How do the ongoing carcinogenicity studies fit in with the conclusions Dr.
Colborn is suggesting?
There are hypotheses that some chemicals display carcinogenic effects on
second and third generations, but the link is not nearly as powerful as the
endocrine-disrupting effects that are being observed.
* Who is denying the viability of these results?
The tier above the scientific community (i.e. economists, lawyers) have
the most difficulty with this issue because they generally seek to target
specific chemicals for regulatory action. Their argument is that if broad
categories of chemicals are regulated together (as the research may be
suggesting is the only real solution), the ramifications of an erroneous
decision are too great to make such action feasible.
* What is your view on the proposed phase out of chlorine?
It is vital that we begin to conduct business differently. We must make
sure that nothing new goes into the environment that can have similar
negative effects and we must begin to search for substitutes, while
recognizing the importance of chlorine in some products and processes.
* Is there a cutoff point below which chlorinated chemicals can be
considered to be "o.k."?
The problem in answering this question is that it is very difficult (or
impossible) to obtain the materials from manufacturers to conduct testing
and to obtain information gathered by industry.
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* What is your opinion on chlorination for water disinfection?
This is an example of a chlorine use for which alternatives do exist.
Chlorine should only be used in closed, contained systems.
* Research should be conducted more strategically. That is, if a class of
chemicals is tested by randomly selecting individual compounds, and
negative effects are consistently demonstrated, then it should not be
necessary to test all of the chemicals in the class. These results would
provide enough justification to find alternatives.
* What would be the basis for clustering chemicals in order to undertake
such random testing?
It would be difficult, but it is something that needs to be done. One
solution might be to start with the chemicals produced in the largest
volumes (i.e. having the highest exposure potential).
* What if substitutes are not available?
It is important not to prefer substitutes that allow for lower volumes at the
expense of higher toxicity. It is more effective to take action such as
reducing the acreage to which a chemical is applied. [Cuba, for example,
has been successful in organically growing fruits and vegetables at a time
when Cuban farmers cannot afford pesticides.]
Meeting: 26 January 1994
TITLE: Chlorine: Can We Live With It, Can We Live Without It?
Mr. Lienhart began by affirming the commitment on the part of
industry to participate in an ongoing dialogue and to share such information
as they may have. He provided a broad overview of the current debate as
perceived by the chlorine industry. Citing the recent Charles River Associates
study, he noted that the value of chlorine chemistry, if replaced, is
approximately $100 billion/year. By chlorine chemistry, industry is referring
to the breadth of application of chlorine, including as an end-product, as a
feedstock, facilitator, or catalyst in a process, or as a component of an end-
product.
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Mr. Lienhart noted the numerous "issue themes" (process emissions,
incineration, toxic use reduction, pollution prevention, risk analysis,
endangered species, to name just a few) that enter into the debate. He also
noted that carcinogenicity is no longer the focus of concern, having been
superseded by new "icitys" (immunotoxicity, teratogenicity, neurotoxicity,
xeno estrogenicity). Furthermore, the problems associated with chlorine use
are no longer limited to human health but extend to general environmental
health as well. Mr. Lienhart also noted the large number of governmental
and non-governmental groups involved in discussing these issues.
Industry's view is that 90 percent of EPA's activities have some chlorine
connection. Also, there are 16 regulatory standards passed within the last 20
years through which industry currently operates.
Mr. Lienhart suggested that the chlorine dialogue could be framed by
the views of groups such as Greenpeace, who would ask "Can we live with
it?," and the view of the chlorine industry, who would ask "Can we live
without it?" He presented a number of issues within this framework,
including:
• the call for a total ban on chlorine use versus the view that chlorine
chemistry represents to wide a range of uses and applications to allow such
broad categorization;
* the belief that chlorine chemistry is largely untested and is likely to
include more "bad actors" like those previously identified versus the
claim that products now undergo significant testing in order to ensure that
no "bad actors" reach the market (a pesticide, for example, can go through
125 tests at an expense of $40 million and eight years of research);
[The debate is open on the testing of industrial products, which must be
addressed through a careful examination of the effectiveness of the Toxic
Substances Control Act.]
* the assertion that chlorine chemistry processes are out of control versus
the belief that industry needs only to do a better job of communicating the
controls that are built in to the processes;
* application of the precautionary principle versus the need for more and
better science; and
* the belief that chlorine chemistry is easily substituted for versus the need
to look as carefully at the potential substitutes as we would the chlorine
products.
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Mr. Lienhart suggested that a set of four principles (published as
"major principles on which scientific analyses must be based") should be
examined for their relevancy in this dialogue. These principles are:
1) The fate and biological activity of a compound are determined by the
chemical properties of the compound.
2) Compounds do not show adverse effects below certain threshold
concentrations, and the magnitude of response is related to dose.
3) Inherent metabolic processes allow organisms to accommodate low doses
of chlorinated organic chemicals.
4) Observations associated with the presence of a certain compound must be
biologically plausible effects, based on the specificity of the compound's
activity in experimental systems.
Mr. Lienhart stated that it is essential that we develop universally
accepted systems that allow us to deal with situations where a chemical is
found to be toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative. He presented the types of
decision trees that are being looked at to serve as appropriate tools. He also
stressed the importance of rigorous analysis, including life cycle analyses,
when substitutability is being considered. Mr. Lienhart noted that the
chemical industry thrives on new science and technology and is not afraid of
actively engaging in a dialogue to find acceptable substitutes or other
solutions.
During a discussion period, the following questions and issues were
raised. Mr. Lienhart's responses are provided.
* Do multinational companies follow the same principles outside the U.S.
as they do when operating within the U.S.?
The same standards would apply in any OECD country; however, the
playing field is clearly different in the rest of the world. This is a challenge
that needs to be addressed.
* Could you comment on efforts in the area of workplace health and safety?
This area is not taken for granted by industry. We are working hard to
better quantify exposures and to gather accurate epidemiological data.
* Given that so many chlorine compounds undergo transformations,
breakdowns, etc., isn't it fair to say that the multinationals in fact have
very little control over the bulk of exposures, but because the are the start
point they bear the most responsibility?
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Agreed, and therein lies the challenge. It's a question of effective
leadership and stewardship.
* The focus on substitutability, risk analysis, and other rational trade-off
systems is useful for industry, but off the point. Shouldn't the focus be on
more fundamental questions? The real problem is that we are lacking a
true mechanism to even join the debate.
* In addition to the scientific models used to analyze risk, toxicity, etc., what
models are used for political and economic analyses, given that one of the
major challenges is predicting future regulatory environments?
The answer is to apply as much of the scientific model as possible and then
control by assuming a much shorter life cycle than would previously have
been the case, since future regulatory environments can not be accurately
predicted.
* What is the perception in industry of the results presented by Dr. Colborn
and others, and how is this influencing industry's thinking?
Industry takes these results very seriously. The questions now being asked
concern the significance of the results and what to do about it.
* What about the question of "ignorance," that is, not even being able to
know what potential negative effects should be examined until a problem
becomes evident?
This is an important question and one that we must keep in mind as we
look for new and better ways to find solutions.
* What efforts are being made to re-test existing products under new
regulations, especially with regard to breakdown products, synergistic
effects, etc.?
Mechanisms are in place. When they are not being used on a consistent
basis, that is more a problem of political will than anything else.
* Aren't the four principles you cited out of date and not applicable beyond
the concerns regarding carcinogenicity on which they are based?
Yes. These principles are cited because they are the principles embodied in
current regulatory policy. The new "icitys" are challenging these
principles.
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* Are we ready to act in a regulatory way as we would as a parent? That is,
are we ready to act on the basis of the precautionary principle?
Efforts such as Responsible Care and product stewardship are moving us
in that direction.
* Can you comment on inter-industry research and development efforts
that might be ongoing?
Little if any inter-industry collaboration exists for new product
development. The study of health science issues is being done
collaboratively because this is the only cost-effective way to do it. In the
future, we may find that collaboration is also the only way to develop new
products.
* Is the CMA looking ahead to other, non-chlorinated chemicals that may
also be, for example, estrogenic?
Industry is looking at many other chemicals. The debate is really about
chemistry in general, but it is organized around chlorine chemistry
because this represents such a large piece of the total chemical industry.
* Is it possible to have more general screens for chemicals rather than the
very specific, chemical-by-chemical testing that is now undertaken, and
would such screens counteract the problems of not knowing in advance
what problems to look for?
This is not only possible, but essential. The decision-tree types of analyses
will hopefully allow us to move in that direction.
Meeting: 5 April 1994
TITLE: Toxicological Questions Associated with Organochlorine
Compounds
The first Spring semester meeting of the chlorine seminar after the
joint series with 5.92 featured a presentation by Professors Rick Danheiser and
Gerry Wogan of the Department of Chemistry on the toxicological questions
associated with organochlorine compounds. They developed their
presentation largely on the basis of questions submitted in advance by
seminar participants. In particular, Profs. Danheiser and Wogan focused on
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the following set of questions: Does it make sense to group organochlorine
compounds into classes for the purpose of regulating those classes? What is
the scientific basis, if any, for such groupings? How does the way in which
toxicity is evaluated affect the reasonableness of this approach?
Professor Danheiser opened with a discussion of risk assessment. The
three factors that generally lead to a definition of risk are persistence,
bioaccumulation, and metabolic breakdown of any particular chemical
compound. The focus of past seminar meetings has been on these factors.
However, Prof. Danheiser noted, the characterization of a compound as
persistent, bioaccumulative, and resistant to metabolic breakdown leads only
to the potential for toxicity (defined here as capable of producing adverse
human health effects). There is a need to focus more closely on toxicity in
order to determine the most appropriate regulatory actions.
Two questions arose during the course of this discussion. First, how
would one evaluate non-persistent, non-accumulative compounds that are
still toxic? Prof. Danheiser explained that such compounds are not being
considered in this discussion, since these are not characteristics generally
associated with the chronic toxicity of organochlorine compounds. He did
acknowledge that other situations, such as the non-biological transformation
(dechlorination) of dioxins, are relevant to the overall chlorine debate.
Second, is the focus only on human health? It was noted that ecological
effects can be signals of potential human effects. Prof. Danheiser agreed that
this is an important question, saying that there is an implicit assumption that
a compound harmful to wildlife will be harmful to humans. The case of
DDT, for example, makes such assumptions problematic; DDT, it could be
argued, has saved more lives worldwide than possibly even penicillin
through its ability to target disease-carrying insect populations.
Prof. Danheiser continued with a focus on the dose-response
relationship. To paraphrase the 16th-century physician and medical pioneer
Paracelsus, all things are poison if taken in sufficient quantity. In evaluating
toxicity, we must always keep in mind the dose or level of exposure. It is well
known that certain trace elements (e.g. selenium) which are toxic at sufficient
concentrations are in fact essential to human health at very low
concentrations.
The remainder of Prof. Danheiser's presentation was a critical analysis
of a Greenpeace statement that organochlorine compounds should be treated
as a single class because when chlorine is added to a hydrocarbon, the result is
something that is always more stable, more resistant to breakdown, tends to
be more bioaccumulative, and tends to have increased toxicity. With regard
to any intrinsic stability of chlorinated compounds, Prof. Danheiser said that
it is reasonable to argue that substituting chlorine for hydrogen usually
increases the reactivity of the compound. He gave five specific examples,
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noting that hundreds more would also show that the chlorinated compound
would readily react with water to form inorganic chloride. When
organochlorines are categorized as being extremely stable, it is because only a
narrow slice of all compounds is being considered; a random sampling of all
possible categories would show that stability decreases with chlorination. A
seminar participant asked if a "family" of stable organochlorines could be
identified. Prof. Danheiser answered that it would be very difficult because
even a very stable compound can become unstable as the result of a very
slight chemical transformation. Prof. Wogan added that it is not only the
chemical structure that is important but also the availability of
microorganisms to break down a compound.
Next, Prof. Danheiser demonstrated why it is difficult to say that all
organo-chlorines are persistent and bioaccumulative. Some compounds that
are considered toxic in part due to persistence and bioaccumulativity (DDT,
kepone, chlordane, dioxin) are similar in that they are polychlorinated, have
one or more rings, and are either aromatic or aliphatic compounds.
However, there are even more chlorinated compounds (chloroform,
ascochlorin, nitrogen mustard) in which the most significant functionality is
unrelated to the chlorine component.
Prof. Danheiser also discussed the issue of "natural" vs. "unnatural"
organo-chlorine compounds, the argument being that the introduction of
synthetic chemicals into the environment is dwarfed by the compounds that
are already there. More than 2,000 organochlorines present in nature have
been characterized, a number that continues to increase as researchers focus
on the chlorine-rich marine environment. Methylene chloride is generated
by man at a rate of approximately 26,000 tons/year, whereas nature generates
on the order of 5,000,000 tons/year through combustion and biological
activity. In terms of average daily consumption of toxic compounds, only 0.09
mg are attributable to synthetic pesticide residues, whereas 1,500 mg are
natural plant "pesticides" (natural plant defense mechanisms, which are a
subject of the growing discipline of chemical ecology), and 2,000 mg result
from cooking practices such as barbecuing. It is important that the existence
of "natural" toxins be taken into account in risk assessments and as resources
are allocated to promote human health.
Prof. Wogan continued the discussion, prefacing his remarks with the
observation that the awareness of the attention paid to the potential human
health effects of organochlorine compounds is comparable to where we were
30 or 40 years ago with respect to carcinogenicity and mutagenicity. Prof.
Wogan began with a review of the basic components of risk assessment:
Hazard Identification (determining if a cause-effect relationship exists), Dose-
Response Assessment (constructing dose-incidence predictions for humans),
and Risk Characterization (predicting incidence of disease in humans). He
then discussed in more detail the first component, hazard identification, and
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noted the need for more research in this area to improve our ability to
determine what the real priority risks are. Animal bioassays are a common
method to identify potential hazards (carcinogens), but the very rigid protocol
for mouse and rat tests is both expensive ($2-3 million per compound) and
time-consuming (34 years per compound). [In response to a question, Prof.
Wogan explained that this protocol does not take into account mechanisms
such as "promoters" which when present greatly increase cancer incidence in
test subjects.] More than 600 compounds have been tested in this manner, but
this is only a small fraction of the universe of compounds that could be
evaluated. It is simply impractical to test and classify each one. Furthermore,
bioassays were never intended for use in risk assessment, but since the
protocol calls for three dose levels per test, it is possible to construct risk
profiles. Finally, there is no comparable paradigm for other kinds of (non-
carcinogenic) biological activity, so our ability to rigorously evaluate
compounds of concern such as organo-chlorines is somewhat inhibited. Prof.
Wogan described the Ames assay (which uses mutagenic activity as an
indicator for carcinogenicity) and suggested that the development of novel
assay techniques would go a long way toward determining which compounds
pose the greatest risks.
Prof. Wogan then returned to the question of whether organochlorines
can be usefully grouped into distinct classes. The characteristics that would
allow classification must be measurable and quantifiable; possible classes
might be based on chemical structure, toxicological effects (cancer endpoints
or estrogen mimics, for example), or structure-activity relationships.
However, to illustrate the difficulty involved in this kind of exercise, Prof.
Wogan cited the work of the International Agency for Research on Cancer,
which has published monographs on the carcinogenic risks of various
compounds. Each compound is given a designation based on its suspected
level of carcinogenicity: Group 1 compounds are considered carcinogenic to
man; Group 2A compounds are probable carcinogens, while Group 2B
compounds are possible carcinogens; Group 4 compounds are considered
non-carcinogenic; and Group 3 includes everything that does not fit into one
of the other categories. Of the compounds tested, 47 have been categorized as
Group 1, though this includes types of exposure as well as individual
chemicals.
A sampling of organochlorines illustrates the uncertainty associated
with a compound-by-compound assessment. Two compounds (BCME and
vinyl chloride) are in Group 1. PCBs are in Group 2A, while TCDD,
DDT/DDE, and kepone are Group 2B. Dieldrin, dicofol, and methoxychlor are
in Group 3. All of the Group 2 and 3 compounds cited are also suspected
estrogen mimics, suggesting that there is no obvious correlation between
carcinogenicity and this additional negative characteristic; this further
complicates efforts to group organochlorines by class. An additional
complicating factor is IARC's classification of certain estrogens (DES, estrogen
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replacement therapy, and oral contraceptives) as Group 1 cancer risks. If we
were to assume that organochlorines are estrogen mimics, what should we
conclude about carcinogenicity?
Prof. Wogan provided a review of the way in which estrogens work in
the human body so that seminar participants would have a better
understanding of the risks posed by estrogen mimics. The mechanism by
which estrogens (or mimics) bind to proteins, creating a complex that can
recognize and activate certain DNA sequences, is key to the understanding of
estrogen mimics in the environment. Traditional bioassays for estrogenic
activity have been in vivo; new in vitro assays (analogous to the Ames assay
for carcinogenicity) may offer greater insights and help to identify the risks
associated with organochlorines. Prof. Wogan also described how the
molecular structures of estrogenic chemicals vary widely, making it difficult
to predict estrogen mimicry on the basis of structure-activity relationships.
An important issue in the study of environmental estrogens is recognition of
the fact that effects of estrogen mimics are seen very early in embryonic
development whereas carcinogens manifest themselves in mature
organisms.
*33** ** **** *********
Meeting: 26 April 1994
TITLE: Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and the Chlorine
Controversy
The second Spring meeting of the Chlorine Seminar featured a
presentation by Edmond Toy, a first-year graduate student in the Technology
and Policy Program, on the use of risk assessment and risk management in
determining science-based policy. This issue is particularly important because
of the central role that "risk" plays in the ongoing chlorine debate.
The presentation was based on two questions: what effect will existing
risk assessment and risk management techniques have on the effort to
resolve regulatory issues pertaining to chlorine use and what effect will the
chlorine debate have on the development and institutionalization of risk
assessment and risk management? The concept of "weight of evidence" was
used as a vehicle for discussion.
Weight of evidence is a potentially confusing term whose definition
varies from one interest group to another. In the chlorine debate,
environmental advocates would contend that the weight of evidence
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indicates potentially harmful effects from any use of chlorinated organic
compounds, thereby justifying broad bans or restrictions on chlorine use.
Industry groups, however, adhere to an interpretation based on the scientific
method, which allows them to contend that the weight of evidence does not
yet support the claim that chlorine is harmful to humans in all forms and
uses. Mr. Toy presented the argument that neither can be considered the
"correct" interpretation; rather, weight of evidence is simply one part, albeit a
necessary one, of risk assessment. A brief discussion that followed pressed the
point further, leading to the idea that weight of evidence is a framework
within which evidence is of secondary importance to our decisions on how to
use that evidence (i.e., what actions do we hope to promote through one
"weighting" scheme or another).
A brief history of risk assessment at the federal level was presented.
The 1983 National Research Council document entitled "Risk Assessment in
the Federal Government: Managing the Process" (commonly referred to as
the "Red Book") made the distinction between risk assessment and risk
management, noting that the former is science-based where the latter
includes political, economic, and social value considerations. In response to
criticism that values can not possible be excluded from the scientific process,
the proposed guidelines set up a system in which the selection of "inference
options" (options based on reasonable scientific principles) would be
consistent among researchers and from one assessment to the next. The NRC
document also first put forth the four-step risk assessment process of hazard
identification, dose-response assessment, exposure prediction, and risk
characterization.
The presentation continued with a discussion of EPA's carcinogenic
risk assessment guidelines. Compounds are classified on the basis of an
examination of human epidemiology, long-term animal tests, and
"supporting information" such as Ames tests and structure-activity
relationships. The supporting information does not factor heavily in a cancer
risk determination; classifications are based primarily on the quality of
available human and animal data. However, this process is fluid. The
weights given to different kinds of evidence have changed over time on the
basis of political considerations as well as advances in scientific
understanding of carcinogens. To demonstrate the difficulty associated with
inference option choices, Mr. Toy showed three graphs illustrating dose-
response curves for a particular chlorinated compound. In the first, the
curves were based on assays of two tumor types and showed a positive
correlation. The second, based on two different tumor types, showed a
negative correlation between dose and response. The third graph combined
the first two and, as expected, could only be described as inconclusive. This
simple demonstration was especially significant because the compound for
which the data were presented was dioxin.
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Mr. Toy then presented EPA's guidelines for developmental toxicity
risk assessment. As with carcinogenicity, these guidelines, first issued in 1986
and revised in 1991, are intended to provide a consistent scheme for the
selection of inference options across chemicals. However, in a departure
from the four-step process for cancer risk assessment, EPA combined hazard
identification with dose-response data in order to take into account factors
such as duration of exposure, time of exposure, and route of exposure. This
change is in recognition of the different mechanisms by which
developmental toxins act on organisms. Four assumptions are made in
developmental toxicity risk assessment. The first is that observable effects in
animals imply potential hazards to humans. Second, multiple
developmental effects are considered, and the observation of any one implies
some effect in humans though not necessarily the same effect. Third, as a
default the most sensitive species is used for evaluative purposes, and fourth,
a threshold is assumed to exist for developmental toxicity.
The weight of evidence scheme for developmental toxicity risk
assessment differs from that for carcinogenicity. Evidence is considered either
sufficient or insufficient (as opposed to the five possible classifications for
carcinogenicity: sufficient, limited, inadequate, no data, and no evidence). A
determination of sufficiency means that there is cause to proceed with the rest
of the assessment process - exposure assessment and risk characterization. In
this scheme, more evidence is required to judge a chemical as unlikely to be a
hazard than it would be to determine that it is a hazard.
As an example of the use of weight of evidence schemes (and the
associated difficulty), Mr. Toy presented the case of the determination of the
carcinogenic risk of formaldehyde. This case is similar to the chlorine
controversy in that there is a clear, non-trivial constituency that stood to be
affected by any restriction on formaldehyde use. At the time formaldehyde
was being evaluated (in the late 1970s), the Carter Administration's generic
cancer policy stated that animal carcinogens should be considered to be
human carcinogens. A study by the CIIT demonstrated a link between
formaldehyde and cancer in animals. Since the Administration's policy had
been included as part of an OSHA rule, it seemed that a request by the United
Auto Workers for a determination on the hazards of formaldehyde in the
workplace would be an open-and-shut case. However, OSHA ignored its own
rule and refused to restrict formaldehyde use. This prompted judicial
intervention to resolve the dispute. EPA does not have weight of evidence
guidelines in formal rules, so it may be more difficult to ask for a court to
intervene in a chlorine-based risk determination. However, it is worth
asking if current guidelines are sufficient to avoid the type of controversy
seen in the formaldehyde case.
The presentation continued with a discussion of the distinctions that
are made between "regulatory " and "pure" science. Similar to the chlorine
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debate, the Formaldehyde Institute preferred clear scientific evidence as the
basis of regulatory decision making whereas the International Agency for
Cancer Research stated that "for practical purposes" regulators should treat
chemicals known to be animal carcinogens "as if they presented carcinogenic
risk" in humans. IARC's statement reflects the belief that regulations can not
be based on scientific certainties but must instead be pragmatic. The
discussion that ensued, seminar participants cautioned against saying that
there is a difference between regulatory and pure science. Rather, the
important point is whether there is social agreement on the rules with which
evidence is adopted to support one action over another. Another comment
was that it is important to make the distinction between a preference for false
positives or false negatives when evidence is being weighed.
To conclude the seminar and to initiate a discussion of where we
should go in our research to overcome risk assessment obstacles, Mr. Toy
presented the research of John Graham from the Harvard School of Public
Health. Graham has developed a process of "scientific conflict mapping"
which tries to determine if gaining more knowledge generally means a
decrease in policy conflict. The results of Graham's research seem to
demonstrate that more knowledge does not necessarily improve the policy
making process. Though the ensuing discussion did not provide any
answers, it was a useful in that it reinforced in the minds of all participants
the great challenges ahead and the need to consider not only the specifics of a
research effort but also the larger context in which the research is conducted.
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